Eyres-Monsell entered politics as a very young man, after serving eleven years in the Royal Navy. He completed his political career as First Lord of the Admiralty in the aftermath of the Invergordon mutiny. He was in office for the duration of the Disarmament Conference and, when rearmament became the order of the day, set in train some of the building programmes that equipped the Fleet for the Second World War. The most controversial decision made during his period in office was the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, a measure that he saw as an essential preliminary to securing a new agreement to limit naval armaments at the second London Naval Conference in 1936 and a good indicator of Hitler's intentions. He had also to mobilise the Fleet during the Abyssinian crisis, but was out of sympathy with the policy pursued by the Government, which he thought likely to weaken Britain's ability to resist Japanese aggression in the Far East. This may have played some part in his decision to retire from the Government in 1936. A close friend of Baldwin, he had earlier served as the Conservative party's Chief Whip for eight years, 1923 to 1931, and had played a major part in creating the party's system of backbench committees.
Bolton Meredith Monsell was born on 22 February 1881, the son of Lieutenant Colonel Bolton Monsell, and after training as a cadet in HMS Britannia, he went to sea as a Midshipman in 1896. Subsequently he specialised as a torpedo lieutenant. He married Caroline Mary Sybil Eyres in 1904 and thereafter called himself Eyres-Monsell. In 1905 he retired from the Navy and in 1910 was elected as the Conservative MP for South Worcestershire, a seat that he held for the next quarter of a century. Within a year of entering the House, he was made a junior whip and at his first meeting with his Leader told him that he should oppose the Declaration of London. In common with a majority of the Whips, he was against conceding on the House of Lords in 1911, but accepted the decision. On the outbreak of war he returned to the Navy and was on active service throughout hostilities. He commanded Gloworm in 1916 and was promoted Commander in 1917. He returned to politics and the Whips Office at the end of the war and became Civil Lord of the Admiralty in. After the downfall of the Coalition in 1922 he was appointed Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, but when Baldwin became Prime Minister in May 1923 he asked Monsell to take charge of the Whips. Reluctantly Monsell agreed to take the job for a year and in the event continued to serve as Chief Whip in government and opposition until November 1931, when he was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty. He undertook a thoroughgoing reorganisation of the Whips Office ,based on the secretariat left by his predecessor and made good use of the newly formed 1922 Committee. He remained close to Baldwin and the two talked every morning when parliament was sitting.
A tall, handsome and debonair figure, Eyres- Monsell was a highly successful in delivering the Government vote in the division lobbies, and although his naval training had made him something of a disciplinarian, he handled those of his flock who sought to deviate with a nice blend of polite persuasion and hints that otherwise disciplinary measures might have to come into play. There was more than a touch of steel within the velvet glove, and he was regarded as deft in the way he applied both spur and bridle to a large majority. It was to occupy them fully in 1924 that he created a system of backbench committees in the parliamentary party, in some ways a continuation of the work done in opposition.
He proved an influential figure in the inner counsels of the party, persuading Derby to remain in office in November 1923 despite his opposition to tariffs and taking part in more than one lengthy talk with his Leader about the merits and demerits of Churchill's return to the party and to office. He advised Baldwin that he was not sure how the party would take the formula agreed with the trade union leaders on the eve of the General Strike and was relieved when events forced a break in the negotiations. Subsequently he was an influential voice against any legislative action during the course of the strike, arguing that it would be unnecessarily provocative and might well prolong TUC support for the miners.
A major concern was the effect of Chamberlain's Poor Law Reform on the party. In discussion of the legislative programme, he advised that both that subject and the Factories Bill should be held over to a new session of Parliament in November 1927 and Neville Chamberlain feared the worst. As he noted on 5 March, "Yesterday I succeeded at last in getting a conference with the PM, the Chief Whip and the Party Chairman. The PM has got very cold feet again and the other two are assiduously laying icebergs to his extremities..." But in the end the Government ran its full term and Chamberlain had his way. Monsell had wanted to get the Government's constitutional reforms out of the way, but he was not consulted over Birkenhead's proposals for reforming the House of Lords and may not have been altogether sorry when they foundered in the face of evident dislike for them on the Tory benches. Holding the party together when it was divided over its attitude towards protection, or rather its electoral effect, was also a challenge and it seems to have fallen to him to draft the letter Baldwin sent, which embodied the compromise agreed by Cabinet on 2 August 1928. Bridgeman thought it admirable, but that was not the view taken by Amery and Neville Chamberlain who thought him "not a friend on this matter".
In opposition Baldwin faced a good deal of criticism, but Monsell advised that he could hold the party behind him on his support for the Irwin Declaration and when further trouble threatened as a result of Beaverbrook's Empire Free Trade campaign, he refused to be panicked. It was his view that the trouble had not really spread to the Commons, "and you can't do much without the Commons." Although in February 1931, he thought Topping's memorandum, effectively suggesting that Baldwin should resign the leadership, needed to be passed to the Leader, like Bridgeman, he took the view that Baldwin should stay. When the National Government was formed in August 1931, Monsell briefly returned to the post of Government Chief Whip, but after the election was promoted to take Austen Chamberlain's place as First Lord of the Admiralty.
A striking instance of how important the Whip's job can be occurred in this brief period. In the absence of both the Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer, but working closely with the Chairman of Committees, he secured the passage of the bill suspending the Gold Standard through the Commons before the closure fell at 11 p.m., thus ensuring that it went to the Lords in time to be passed in a single day. The Bank had warned at a late stage that if this was not done, there could be a run on the £ in the morning and it fell to Monsell to alert Herbert and agree a course of action with him.
Few men can have taken over a department in a more difficult situation than Monsell did on 9 November 1931. As a result of the pay cuts agreed as part of the emergency budget that had been designed to try to keep Britain on the Gold Standard, the men in parts of the Atlantic Fleet had refused to put to sea. It was evident that a good deal of the blame had to be laid at the Board of Admiralty's door. It seems very likely that this was the reason for Monsell's appointment. "Fortunately", as the Naval historian, Stephen Roskill writes, "his experience of the service, combined with parliamentary skill, tact and patience were such that, after hearing his admission that 'The Navy realises that today we no longer hold that very high opinion in the hearts of the British people that for centuries we have held', Parliament was prepared to accept his plea that its former position 'will be regained all the more quickly if the House of Commons and the country will leave the Navy alone to deal with its own special interests.'"[1] Despite their vehement attempts to exculpate themselves, it is clear that the Sea Lords, whom Monsell inherited, had not handled the situation well and there was very evident tension between the First Sea Lord, Sir Frederick Field, and Sir John Kelly, whom the Government had appointed to take over command of the Atlantic Fleet. Kelly's enquiries into what had happened had led him to conclude that "Officers and Men alike, from the highest to the lowest, appear to attribute the Mutiny.... directly to the Admiralty accepting the 'Cuts' as at first promulgated." Further, he believed that "complete confidence in the Administrative authority will not be restored so long as the present Board of Admiralty remain in office." Although his official report made no mention of the latter conclusion, he had conveyed it to Field in a letter dated 22 October 1931. Early in 1932, Field was taken ill, but it was to be a full year before he gave way to Chatfield as First Sea Lord. In the mean time virtually all of Kelly's recommendations were implemented and Monsell accepted the recommendations of the C-in-Cs of the home ports that Kelly's period in command should be extended, that the Second Sea Lord (responsible for personnel) should be given no further appointment and that the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff should not proceed to command the Atlantic Fleet. Tomkinson, temporarily in command at the time of the Mutiny, was retired and when Sir Roger Keyes questioned this decision in the House of Commons in July 1934, Monsell had no difficulty in rebutting his criticisms. Monsell satisfied himself that Chatfield approved of all the changes before appointing him to replace Field and he also ensured that he and other members of the Board should be assiduous in visiting ships and shore establishments.
Very early in his term of office Monsell had voiced his doubts about the continuance of the Ten Year Rule, which Churchill had set in place to restrict defence expenditure and on 10 February 1932, as a result of events in Shanghai, he called for its removal. He was left with growing worries about Japanese predominance in the Pacific, where he estimated they were in a ratio of 6:3 and he thought some measure of rearmament was necessary. Except in relation to the defence of Singapore, his views did not prevail against those of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but in any case the Naval Treaties were still in force. With the Disarmament Conference in its death throes in the summer of 1933, Monsell ordered that the design of new and larger six inch cruisers to counter those being built by Japan and the Americans should "be pressed on at all possible speed". He intended to order three, but in the event only Southampton and Newcastle were ordered together with one of the smaller Arethusa class. In the summer of 1934, he lost his battle with Chamberlain to strengthen the Fleet Air Arm at the expense of home defence, and during the Abyssinian crisis in the summer and autumn of 1935, his attitude towards any action against Italy was powerfully shaped by his worries about Japan and the Far East. He was reluctant to see Italy antagonised and argued for a peaceful settlement. The Mediterranean was a peaceful sea and should remain so since it would otherwise be difficult to transfer the Fleet to the Far East in the event of trouble with Japan. He strongly opposed sanctions and when the Cabinet eventually resolved on 26 February 1936 to impose an oil sanction on Italy, his dissent was formally recorded in the minutes.
He had already indicated his desire to leave the Government, but Baldwin had persuaded him to stay until the second London Naval Conference had been brought to a conclusion, successful or otherwise. Probably the most controversial decision of Monsell's career was taken as part of the preparation for that Conference. In June 1935 conversations took place between Britain and Germany over the future strength of the German Navy and Ribbentrop came up with a proposal to limit it to 35% of British strength. They also put forward views on qualitative limitation that were close to the British Government's desiderata and even offered to support the abolition of the submarine. Conscious of the growing Japanese threat in the Far East, Monsell welcomed the offer and argued that the implicit breach of the Treaty of Versailles was "purely academic". His concern was that if the Government did not agree, Germany might subsequently ask for a higher ratio, which would prejudice the British position in European waters if she had to despatch the main fleet to the Far East. Germany was offering the ratio as "final and permanent" and the ministerial committee agreed to continue negotiations on that basis. Baldwin's shrewd observation that the agreement would serve Britain well if Germany observed and send a stark warning if broken would seem to have struck a chord with Monsell. At all events he was vigorous in defence of the agreement both in a broadcast and in debate, and he could point to the need to stabilise the situation in the run up to the Naval Conference. Both the United States and Japan supported the move, but it antagonised France and Italy. In the event Germany held to her word so far as surface ships were concerned, but it later transpired that she had exceeded the sixty per cent limit that had been set on submarine construction. In later years Monsell continued to argue that it was right to have made the agreement and he pointed out that, had the Government not done so, it would have come under even more severe public criticism.
As early as the autumn of 1934, Monsell had raised with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, the need to make a start with dealing with deficiencies in the Navy's strength, including an increase in the Fleet Air Arm, but measures to replace and add to overall numbers were, of course, precluded by the Naval Treaties agreed to in 1921 and 1930. Were these to expire without any further Treaty, then building could begin in 1936. The Admiralty therefore submitted to the Defence Requirements Committee, which Baldwin re-established in July 1935, a building programme that would by 1942 spend £226 millions. It included 12 battleships, 4 carriers 23 cruisers, 5 flotillas of destroyers and 24 submarines. The DRC endorsed the proposals almost without change, and they won acceptance from both the Defence Policy and Requirements Committee and the Cabinet. However, it was also decided not to provoke other powers to build by including the full programme in the Defence White Paper of February 1936. The only reservation was the sensible one, that technological developments, particularly in the air, might make some modification of the agreed programme necessary.
In January 1936 Monsell clashed with the Chancellor over the estimates that had been prepared "on the assumption that a considerable increase would be accepted to put the Navy into a thoroughly sound condition within a period of years". They totalled £80.5 million before the imposition of a "shadow cut", but the Chancellor believed that the Admiralty should not anticipate the Defence White Paper that was to be debated in February. The Prime Minister backed his Chancellor and Monsell reluctantly gave way. But the new estimate of just under £70 million was followed by others on Deficiencies and Supplementaries in April and May which added £10.3 million to the total already agreed and provided the funds with which to start two capital ships (King George V and Prince of Wales), five cruisers, one aircraft carrier (Illustrious), nine destroyers, four submarines, six sloops and some smaller craft. Rearmament was thus well under way by the time Monsell left the Admiralty on 6 June, the inevitable result of the failure of the second London Naval Conference to reach agreement on continuing arms limitation.
That the Conference would fail was clear by the time Baldwin opened its proceedings in November, since the Japanese had already made it clear that they would accept nothing less than parity. The proposals for qualitative disarmament fared little better. The Japanese had proposed to do away with aircraft carriers and battleships and to agree a common upper limit for the three main naval powers, the remaining European powers being asked to make their own settlement within that limit. Monsell argued with growing impatience the absurdity of such a proposal since it would allow the major nations small fleets only, while lesser powers would be able to build towards parity with them. However, the real difficulty that the Admiralty had with the proposal was succinctly set out buy his First Sea Lord: Britain was both a Pacific and a European power and therefore needed a ratio of 4 to 2 in relation to Japan whereas the common upper limit would give her only two to two. Although his exasperation was patent, Monsell pushed an alternative proposal, voluntary limitation of construction programmes and notification of their content, but this, as the Japanese observed, would largely maintain the existing position to which they objected. When no agreement could be reached on a common upper limit, the Japanese withdrew on 15 January.
His wife divorced Monsell in 1950 and later that year he married Mrs Essex Drury, the granddaughter of the first Earl of Ypres. When I interviewed him about Baldwin in the mid 1960s he was mentally alert and spry, although by then well into his 80s. He died in 1969.