John Barnes, Historian

The final candidates for the top-of-the table grouping are the Prime Ministers in the other Westminster-style democracies. Clearly their position is inferior to that of a British Prime Minister and the New Zealand Prime Minister now has to grapple with the complexities of managing a coalition government. Writing in the mid 1980s, Weller supplied an interesting table to underpin his verdict. Interestingly has to distinguish between parties as well as countries. Low indicates constraints on a Prime Minister's power, high that the factor is a plus.

Hugh Emy describes the Australian Prime Minister as "in a real sense, the managing director of government", suggesting that cabinet government depends "heavily upon the administrative style, personal idiosyncrasies and political character of the prime minister. The cabinet's significance raises the office of prime minister above that of other ministers."[x] However, he suggests that one must not overrate his power: "the prime minister heads a federal party whose own authority is qualified by the power of the separate state executives. In government Liberal and (to a lesser extent) Labor prime ministers will need to pay careful attention to the views of state governments and state premiers." The Australian Labor party historically was also distrustful of the leader principle, although it has to be added that Hawke has since demonstrated that it is possible to use one's charisma to offset that distrust. Table 7.2

Britain Canada Australia New Zealand

* Depends on whether Government controls the Senate

Neither in Australia nor in Canada are the constraints such as to make it impossible for a dominating Prime Minister to exist - Fraser and Trudeau offer eloquent testimony to that. But it is possible to argue that the British Prime Minister finds it rather easier to exercise strong leadership and that the same was true of New Zealand before the change in its electoral system. In general most New Zealand prime ministers have exhibited a strong preference for collegiality, but Muldoon demonstrated much as Thatcher did in Britain just what the potentialities of the office were.

At the other end of the scale lie Italy and its earlier counterpart, Fourth Republic France. There is a case for including Japan in this group and King would add both the Netherlands and Norway. As he observes of the latter, s/he "is less cock of the walk, more one of the barnyard chickens."[xi] Olsen calls him a "political organiser, but no superstar."[xii] At first sight this is surprising. His is the only cabinet office established by the constitution. He prepares the cabinet agenda has to countersign all decisions of the Council of State. In the absence of the King, he can cast a double vote. But Strom notes that no Prime Minister has ever threatened, much less used his veto power and the cabinet has an implicit unanimity rule. There is a strong drive for consensus. The Prime Minister's influence in Cabinet is therefore little greater than that of his/her colleagues. Eriksen notes a lack of formal powers vis-à-vis those colleagues. He has the right to seek information from them, but he cannot issue orders, change ministerial jurisdictions, or even dismiss them. He suggests therefore that his ability to influence them depends on the support he has from his party. Olsen too has noted that a Norwegian prime minister "has no hierarchical authority over the other members of the cabinet. He cannot issue orders or change their decisions; neither can he dissolve the Storting or call elections." In practice, however, some prime ministers have wielded considerable influence over the selection and dismissal of ministers. Gerhardsen was thought to have had almost complete discretion in this respect, but in coalition government naturally the prime minister has no control over the choices made by his coalition partners. While the Socialists DNA invariably rules alone, the non-socialist parties can only take office as part of a coalition government.

Given the postwar dominance of the LDP in Japan, it might seem surprising that the Japanese prime minister is regarded as being in so weak a position vis-à-vis hid colleagues. However, the reason is not hard to find. The party is made up of powerful factions and usually there is no one faction sufficiently powerful to dominate or even act on its own when choosing the party's president and prime minister (the offices are always held in tandem). Coalitions have to be formed and it was not uncommon for the person emerging as prime minister to be everybody's second choice. They were often the leader of one of the weaker factions or not a faction leader at all. There are exceptions. Sato's eight year tenure, for example, was the result of an absence of competition. Three senior party figures had died early in his term of

Table 7.3 Japanese Prime Ministers 1947-93

Office. Nakasone benefited from the ill health of the leading party figure of the time, Tanaka, but the latter was under a cloud also because of his involvement in the Lockheed scandal. Miki and Miyazawa are examples of the leaders of relatively small factions reaching the office, in Miki's case because he was untainted by the Lockheed scandal and would not pose a threat to the party elders and in Miyazawa's because the Takeshita faction had no candidate of their own and preferred to support him rather than the other two major faction leaders, Mitsuzuka and Watanabe. Even more striking was the choice of Kaifu from the small Komoto faction. Takeshita did not want to take office himself, but feared for his authority in his faction if he backed another member of it for President of the party and Prime Minister. As Hayao makes clear, he felt secure in the knowledge that Kaifu had no independent power base in the party.[xiii] Effectively power within the party was not in the hands of the President6 at all but in those of "kingmakers". Tanaka, for example, had a major hand in the choice of all prime ministers from Ohira through to Nakasone and Allison notes the consequence as this indicted criminal "shaped political opportunities by constraining prime ministers and the party from taking decisive leadership on many issues."[xiv] With personal ambition so dominant, personal programmes were virtually unknown and would in any case have been hard to further. Nakasone was an exception here with his pledges to cut tax and privatise the railways. In general potential prime ministers were skilled at negotiation and compromise and they "tended to dissociate themselves from policy positions that prove ideologically divisive, preferring to rely upon a general consensus so far as possible".[xv] "The intraparty alliances of factions needed to win the presidency", Hayao notes, "are usually built more on promises of party and government posts than on policy considerations, which are generally secondary factors. This means that the prime minister generally cannot claim that he was elected to carry out specific changes."[xvi] Once in office, they have few resources at their disposal and while their constitutional position accords them certain powers, they are relatively unspecific. On occasion relatively dominant figures have been able to offer strong leadership, as Ikeda did with his ten year "income doubling plan". Nakasone established the Management and Coordination Agency in 1984 and reorganised the cabinet secretariat two years later with a view to strengthening the prime minister's capacity to analyse and formulate policy, but the effects seem to have been only marginal. The main problem may well be LDP prime minister's vulnerability to party infighting. Two were forced to stand down after relatively poor electoral performance and five were forced from office as a result of factional strife. Of the remainder two were forced out by financial scandals, two resigned for health reasons and one died. Only two stood down voluntarily.[xvii]

A rather stronger group of premiers would include Belgium, Denmark and Sweden, and possibly Austria as well. Denmark may serve as exemplar. The Danish Cabinet is clearly collegial in nature and the parties that make up the coalition in power have a considerable say in the allocation of ministerial portfolios and the agreed programme that is to be followed. Nevertheless the prime minister has the power to hire and fire individual ministers and acts as the ultimate arbitrator in interministerial disputes where the cabinet itself is unable to reach a decision. Although Schou notes that the Danish system will tolerate only a moderate degree of prime ministerial leadership, he holds that "the overall equilibrium is markedly dependent on the leadership of the prime minister, who carries considerable weight".

So much for taxonomy. The more interesting question is what accounts for the fact that some prime ministers are more influential than others and across quite a wide range. If we cannot immediately find an explanatory theory, we can at least establish the elements from which one might be constructed. One proposition seems to leap out from the brief survey carried out so far and that is the importance of party. It would seem that prime ministers in charge of a single party government (or where the partnership is close to marriage e.g. the Liberal Country coalition in Australia) are the most powerful and that coalition politics leads to a degree of mutual dependence that turns the prime minister into a broker or even, to use Rose's term, a juggler. Indeed King goes so far as to say that "coalitions are inimical to strong prime ministerial government", but almost immediately he observes that, while true, that proposition cannot be the whole truth. Strength it might be said comes from single party government or from coalitions made up of a relatively small number of parties in which one is the dominant partner. But then what of the Nordic countries with single party government, all of whom fall towards the lower end of the range as far as prime ministerial influence goes, with Norway well down the list.

King suggests three possible answers, all plausible and worth taking into account. The first is the prime minister's ability to hire and fire: in other words his ability to control the careers of other politicians within his country's political system. In part this will depend upon the demand for office and the prime minister's ability to gratify it and the latter to some extent will depend upon the amount of patronage at his disposal and more particularly whether he appoints not only senior ministers but the juniors in their office. Linked to this may well be another factor, the prime minister's ability to reshape the structure of government. It will be apparent immediately that this gives the British prime minister very considerable power with up to one hundred offices to dispose of and no need to consult anyone. Inevitably he will have to pay regard to political considerations, but the jigsaw is wholly under his control. He is the central figure in a buyer's market, particularly now that politics has become a career profession. The contrast with the Netherlands could not be more marked. The parties that make up the coalition decide between themselves what portfolios will be allocated to each and then individually settle who shall fill those portfolios. In this process the prime minister is largely a bystander. Andeweg notes that he "may belong to the core group that determines the ministerial team from his own party, but the ministers from other governing parties owe their nominations to their own party's leadership and pay only a ritual visit to the prime minister designate before being sworn in by the Queen." The Dutch prime minister does not expect to be able to reshuffle his Cabinet and a parliamentary enquiry after the war (in which two ministers were dismissed) concluded that he had no power to dismiss individual ministers. In this he finds himself as hamstrung as his Italian counterpart. Clearly coalition inhibits the prime minister's control over the career structure of the political elite but some coalition prime ministers appear to have greater control than others. In marked contrast to the Netherlands, in Hungary, for example, ministers are individually responsible to the prime minister, not to parliament which can only hold the government to account collectively, and the prime minister has a unambiguous right to dismiss them (through the head of state). Reshuffles are common in Britain and ministers cannot resist being moved. Benn had no wish to shift from Industry to Energy, nor did Clarke wish to leave Health for Education. Both men had to move. Sacking is not uncommon, as the "night of the long knives", the removal of the wets in 1981, Lamont's dismissal and the more recent sacking of New Labour Cabinet ministers like David Walker, Lord Richard and Jack Cunningham demonstrates. Sackings are much less frequent in Canada and have proved to be even more difficult to bring about in Australia. But as Muldoon proved in the case of Dennis Quigley in 1982, the power is there in Westminster systems. If it is not used that frequently outside Britain, the reasons are wholly political. Labour prime ministers in Australia and New Zealand face a particular problem, Since their cabinets are chosen for them by the party caucus, it is unclear how far they can go. When in 1975 Whitlam sacked two ministers, he had in effect to seek endorsement from the caucus. Subsequently under Hawke the rules were changed to allow the four parliamentary leaders of the ALP to ask for a minister's resignation. The prime minister cannot act on his own. Reshuffling is a more potent weapon and is frequently deployed by both Liberal and Labor prime ministers in Australia and by Canadian prime ministers. The Taoiseach plays a major role in the shaping of his cabinet and the German Chancellor is certainly not without a part to play in its shaping even though governments in Germany are almost invariably coalitions and those in Ireland increasingly so. By contrast a Norwegian Socialist as prime minister is expected to consult widely among party and interest group leaders before making their choice. Bratteli is known to have been forced to accept members for his cabinet that he was reluctant to include and to drop others whom he wanted in order to accommodate them.

Public visibility, standing and prestige are another major factor, and although where the prime minister personifies his government, he will have to shoulder blame as well as praise, that necessity will make him the more anxious to intervene in his colleagues' affairs, It may also render his colleagues more open to the feeling that he has the right to interfere if he is going to carry the can. Indeed they may come to feel that the reputation of the government as a whole and therefore their won reputation is bound up with that of the prime minister and they will therefor acceded to his wishes so long as they continue to seem likely to lead to success. Most prime ministers are far better known than their ministerial colleagues and where they are not, as in Italy, this may well contribute to their lack of influence. It was that which Craxi set out to redress and the fact that he did so is surely significant. "The expected brevity of a prime minister's tenure, combined with the dual leadership that results from the prime minister/party secretary tandem, ensures that Christian Democrat prime ministers can rarely create an identity in voters' minds between their own political status and that of their partry", Hine and Finocchi note. "Prime Ministers cannot easily take personal credit for government performance, translate it into personal popularity and use it as a resource with which to build up a position of dominance in the party."[xviii]

The third factor which King identifies, he describes as the "legacy of history". I would prefer to characterise it as the "expectations" which the political elite and public have about the job a prime minister does. No doubt history plays its part. It was said of Roosevelt that no president thereafter would be able to think small and similarly in Britain prime ministers like Lloyd George, Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair have stretched the job specification. It is equally significant surely that in the Netherlands the office of Minister President was not introduced until shortly after the First World War and that until 1922 the chairmanship of the council of ministers rotated either by seniority or selection by colleagues. Even after 1922 the Dutch prime minister usually held the office in conjunction with some other department.

Somewhat surprisingly, King makes no mention of constitutional and legal resources, although these can have a considerable effect on prime ministerial power. This is most obvious perhaps in a federal system like that of Germany

However, as we shall see later, the existence and powers of a constitutional court can be an important check on executive power whether they system is unitary or federal and in so far as the prime minister is the dominant force in the executive that check operates also on his role. It is possible for constitutional provisions to operate to his advantage. The constructive vote of no confidence, which is to be found in Germany, Hungary and Spain, undoubtedly makes the chances of a successful challenge less likely. In Britain the right to seek a parliamentary dissolution has by convention become vested in the Prime Minister and not the Cabinet. The same is true for Canada. In Hungary ministers are not individually responsible to parliament, but to the prime Minister. On the other hand, while the Hungarian parliament can dissolve itself early, the Government cannot go for an early dissolution. The Norwegian government is in a like position vis-à-vis the Storting, and there can be no doubt that this weakens the prime minister's position. The relationship between the prime minister and head of state also needs careful dissection, since most presidents are not altogether deprived of political resources and can exercise some influence, in particular on which governments form. Another important aspect, as we have already noted, is the ability to shape the government machine. If a prime minister can create new departments or alter the scope of existing departments, he is invariably in a stronger position that the prime minister who has no authority at all over the machinery of government.

But the key relationship, and one for which King's first point has enormous relevance, is the relationship between a prime minister and his colleagues

One strength of the prime minister, well identified by Lalonde writing about Canada, is the "continuing and pressing need for centralized planning and coordination."[xix] There has been continuing concern in the British system that the centre of government is too weak. To some extent the Blair reforms have been designed to address this crticism, although it is too soon to assess whethet they have worked. What is significant is that they have centred on the Prime Minister's office. The principal fault of the system has long been identified as "departmentalitis". When talking about British government, the late Lord Armstrong, a former head of the Treasury and then of the Civil Service, laid stress on the fact that British Government was a "government of departments". In his Reith lectures Sir Douglas Wass, formerly Permanent Secretary of the Treasury and joint Head of the Civil Service, argued that the form and structure and agenda of a modern Cabinet "almost oblige[d] it to function like a group of individuals, and not as a unity", a judgment amply confirmed by Bruce Headey's interviews with Cabinet Ministers from both parties. He concluded that such a body not only could be railroaded by a strong departmental minister, but that it seldom had the time or opportunity to review and assess the general thrust of the Government's policies. To some extent, his views resembled those earlier put forward by a distinguished Permanent Secretary, Sir Richard Clarke, to his colleagues. Sir Kenneth Berrill, head of the CPRS and later Chief Economic Adviser to the Government, when making a case for a Prime Minister's Department, argued that the sum total of departmental interests did not amount to a strategy and that incoming ministers speedily donned departmental spectacles. Sir John Hunt, Cabinet Secretary from 1973 until 1979, also concluded that Cabinets were not well placed to exercise a clear strategic oversight in relation to the manifold activities of Government, but if they did not do so, there was "an inbuilt risk that decisions may be taken in an arbitrary, uncoordinated and even contradictory manner." The reason ‑ Cabinet ministers were immersed in their departmental work [Hunt 1983]. All these views in one way or another confirm Crossman's judgement, "perhaps the biggest task of a Prime Minister is to stop the fragmentation of the Cabinet into a mere collection of departmental heads".[xx] Their testimony is significant in the emphasis it lays on departmental pluralism with an ill‑equipped Prime Minister as the best person to check it. It led me directly to the second main proposition in what I have elsewhere described as the symbiotic model - that strong Cabinet ministers need a strong prime minister, whose central task is to give them strategic direction.

Prime Ministers in the major states have undoubtedly gained in prestige from their almost continuous involvement in international dealings of one kind or another. It would be almost impossible for them to leave most of this to a Foreign Minister. But there is a price to pay as well as advantages to be reaped. Time is in short supply. Squandering it an area where rewards are hard to earn may not be the best possible use of a Prime Minister's day. But the choice is no longer open. Participants in the European Union spend much time on their preparation for and their negotiations at regular European summits. These have now been institutionalized. Periodically they have also to exercise the European presidency. While these meetings and roles affect every member state, the meetings of the G7 and 8 are confined to the larger powers, but there is also a good deal of top level diplomacy to absorb valuable prime ministerial time. The political reward is there and Elgie has stressed also the gain in stature, domestic and not merely international, to those who command the nuclear button.

To carry out the essential tasks of their office, prime ministers need good relations with the permanent civil service and a powerful staff of their own. The overall size of that staff may not be the most important factor.

Party is, however, the major political resource at the disposal (or otherwise) of the Prime Minister. There is an obvious advantage to combining the leadership of the government with that of a major party, although if the party is factionalised, it may be difficult to capitalise on that advantage. Normally the leader of a single-party majority government will find him or herself in a very strong position, but absence of cohesion can undermine those advanatages, as John Major found. Managing a coalition, however, is usually harder

Jones offers some cautionary words, which we need to bear in mind when making comparisons: Power is a relationship, involving as well as the Prime Minister, at least one other entity or person" and they have their own resources as well as a possible share in common resources. They need one another and therefore a balance has to be struck. It is almost impossible therefore to calculate the power of a prime minister since that power will vary with the situation with which he is dealing, the other actors and situations with which he is engaged simultaneously and with his overall standing at that particular point in time. Nevertheless the examination of the way in which the Prime Minister operates in often segmented policy areas will give us some feeling for the way in which resources are dispersed around the system and the circumstances in which Prime Ministers are likely to be able to deploy their resources successfully. Comparisons can be struck and judgements reached as to which factors matter most