Political Change
Lecture 3
? October 2001
Two linked problems:
A) identifying the reasons for the Conservative defeat in 1945; and
B) the nature of Labour's victory.
The latter will cast some light on the incoming Labour Government's freedom of manoeuvre.
One possible explanation is the radicalising nature of war (Marwick).
Apart from Marwick, the literature affords four possible explanations or sets of explanation. They are not mutually exclusive and, at risk of overdetermination, could be seen as cumulative.
I) The first centres on the replacement of one regime by another and is articulated by Addison. It identifies the political crisis of 1940 as crucial.
(a) military defeat in Norway and France discredit the pre-war Conservative regime, who are seen to have brought Britain into (an unnecessary) war badly prepared. Cf. Guilty Men.
(b) Labour is able to force its way into Government and thereafter to dominate the home front. It has the singular advantage of being in Government and Opposition at one and the same time.
(c) Churchill tends to eliminate from office all but the pre-war foreign policy dissidents and is seen himself as a national figure, not a Conservative leader.
II) The second attributes Labour's victory to a rising tide of radicalism and is clearly related to Marwick's position, although not identical with it. More stress is laid on the development of "war socialism" and Miliband in particular attributes the 1945 victory to this.
(a) the notion of the people's war articulated by Orwell is the central theme of Calder's book.
(b) Equality of sacrifice and the popularity of rationing.
(c) Planning and science.
(d) Admiration for Russia. Pelling's notion of a choice between the Soviet Union and the USA.
(e) ABCA and the army.
III) Never again. A more general rejection of the inter-war period linked to the sense that Lloyd George's coalition government had betrayed "the people" after their effort and sacrifice in the First World War. The war had shown what could be done - why not apply its lessons to reconstruction.
IV) Rather more contingent is the explanation that the Conservative refusal to accommodate the drive for social reform as exemplified in their reaction to the Beveridge Report. Labour is able to divide the Commons on the issue, illustrating the advantages of being in both Government and Opposition. Although Churchill committed himself in the end to a Four Year Plan, it was in effect too late.
One explanation can almost certainly be dismissed out of hand, although it figures in a great many accounts. Churchill's "Gestapo" speech. In fact the campaign saw a swing to the Conservatives. What the speech may have done is to tie Churchill firmly to the Conservative camp, putting an end to hopes(on the part of the electorate) that he might be wooed into a coalition and polarising choice. This appears to have helped the Tories gain a greater share of the vote than they might otherwise have polled.
In sorting out which of these explanations are plausible, a crucial question is when did the swing to the left take place. Gallup poll evidence pointing clearly to a Labour victory relates to 1943/44. However, there is earlier evidence from two sources that suggests it had taken place by the end of 1942.
A. Mass Observation
B. Home Intelligence
There is also a good deal of evidence that suggests disillusion with those in power in 1940.
If so, that would tend to rule out Beveridge and the Conservative reaction to it as a prime cause of the Conservative defeat, although it could still be argued that it inhibited any chance of a Conservative recovery.
"War socialism" was something detected by Home Intelligence and the Soviets were popular amongst the working class even before the war. Fielding is critical, suggesting a more widespread disillusion with politics. Little evidence of support for specific socialist measures. NB the 1942 Social Survey Report which revealed widespread distrust of government promises and even of the National Savings movement's intentions in regard to honouring its promises. It is surprising that if Miliband was right, the tide should ebb so swiftly after the war. Perhaps helped gain middle class/intellectual support - the thinking minority of between 5-20% which actively supported state intervention and altruistic policies.
Worth looking at Gallup on the issues: asked what questions would be the most discussed, the answers were
Housing 41%
Full Employment 15%
Social Security 7%
Nationalisation 6%
International Security 5%
In their election addresses no less than 97% of Labour candidates and 94% of Conservatives dealt with housing. The next two subjects were social security (77 and 81.5%) and full employment (79 and 73%)
Beveridge may not therefore be the issue that some have thought. Churchill may have neutralised the effect.
Was there any particular impact on the army? Recent accounts play down the Service vote, but are they right? Was ABCA no more than a Conservative alibi? The testimony to the army vote is universal and convincing. What part did ABCA play?
The notion of a general rejection of the 1930s is much harder to demonstrate although McCallum and Readman trace a change of tone in the election addresses. Although the prewar distressed areas went strongly for Labour these were their heartlands in any case. Not sure how far the 30s myth had yet been created.
The paradox of 1945 is that of Conservative recovery from the depths. Best explained by
(a) association of Churchill's prestige with Conservative party, but that has a downside - can't defend 1930s record.
(b) Resumption of partisan politics (NB the press)
One issue dominates public debate (housing) and on that Labour promises are large and Conservative action faulty. Cf. Portal’s failure, the appointment of Sandys, who did much to get the sites operational and prefabs prefabricated, but there was no enough time to get them on to site.
Conclusion.
Conservatives blamed for the war, lack of preparation and amongst the working class its failure to ally with Russia.
War did suggest that socialist planning worked and more controversially that it did engender more egalitarian and communitarian feelings. Mainly a middle class phenomenon? Certainly not deep-rooted
Conservatives seem to have escaped surprisingly unscathed from the Beveridge row, but they were less fortunate over housing. Did that raise memories of LG and was Churchill seen as a man of war, not peace?