John Barnes, Historian

(c) John Barnes

Beatty of the North Sea

Version 5 Last revised 23 January 2015

Chapter Eight ~ The Dogger Bank Action

The New Year brought with it much worse weather. Although this did not prevent a successful operation to lay mines on the Amrum Bank on the night of 8 January, it disrupted the plans that Keyes and Tyrwhitt had for a new seaplane raid on the Zeppelin sheds. The war group at the Admiralty were casting around for plans that would carry the offensive to the Germans without making use of heavy ships. Fisher was increasingly nervous about the impact of Germany’s submarines. On 4 January he wrote to Jellicoe, “the one great naval policy is to conserve our ships and not send them out as food for German submarines!” It was a message frequently repeated, as Jellicoe subsequently told Beatty, and, to a lesser extent, one echoed by Churchill, who wanted them kept in harbour, conserved for operations in the Baltic. Nevertheless Churchill was irritated by Jellicoe’s claims about the relative strengths of the Grand and High Sea Fleets. “It is astonishing how quickly our supposed superiority in dreadnoughts and Battle Fleets vanishes,” Jellicoe reminded Fisher on 17 January. “To-day I have 19 battleships (dreadnoughts) plus 7 ‘King Edwards’ to meet 16 German dreadnoughts and8 ‘Deutschlands’ plus twelve 4^th and 5^th Squadrons which is what would come out of they meant business. I hope these figures will be borne in mind, together with the fact that they would certainly turn up with at least eight flotillas – 88 torpedo boat destroyers to my 32 ... I think I am not importunate in asking for a third flotilla, since I have not been given my ‘Galateas’ and one of my best Cruiser Squadrons (the First) is being taken away south.” ¹ It is not easy to recapture the rather tense atmosphere that prevailed in the Grand Fleet after the Monarch and the Conqueror collided and Superb stripped a turbine. Jellicoe also wanted one of the Battle Cruiser Squadrons, preferably the 1^st, to return to Cromarty once Invincible joined them, and he asked whether it was really necessary to send Inflexible to relieve Indefatigable? Could not the French cope with the Goeben? “I have wired suggesting ‘Inflexibles’ should return to England, as really our margin is too slight to ensure a real crushing defeat of the High Sea Fleet, and I cannot for the life of me see why the French can’t look after a crock like the Goeben whilst Indefatigable refits… With Conqueror and Superb away for an indefinite time, and two other ships – one battleship and one battle cruiser – refitting (this is essential or we shall have more breakdowns), the margin is too thin when you take into consideration the immense superiority the Germans will certainly have in torpedo bopat destroyers at Armageddon, and the losses I may suffer before and during the fight from mines and submarines.”²

On 2 January the Princess Royal rejoined the 1^st Battle Cruiser Squadron, but Beatty’s force was as yet incomplete. Indomitable returned from refit in the New Year, but Invincible, after making temporary repairs in the Falklands, made for Gibraltar where she spent a month in dock. The chance was taken to add 15 feet to her forward funnel to reduce the chance that smoke would block visibility from her bridge and spotting top. She did not sail for England until 15 February.³ HMAS Australia had been on passage to the West Indies when she was diverted to Gibraltar, but she was not ordered to sail for Plymouth until 20 January. She would undergo a brief refit before becoming flagship of the 2^nd Battle Cruiser Squadron on 17 February 1915. Beatty had been promised reinforcement: “What I am planning is for Queen Elizabeth, Inflexible, Invincible and Indomitable being your second division, to be stationed at Rosyth”, Fisher wrote on 6 January. “Tell me minutely which you prefer and don’t mention writing to me to anyone at all – I will tell Jellicoe myself that I am writing to you. Remember you have ever so much greater chances from acting from Rosyth than from Cromarty! I think Rosyth the most damnable spot on earth myself a nd stopped it for 5 years, nevertheless it is there now and we have to use it!”⁴ In reply Beatty described the proposal as sound, but he wanted the new squadron to be termed the 2^nd Division as it would be under his command and “imbued with the same ideas and principles which have governed our training in the past”. He also wanted both divisions to operate from the same base. Although he remained fully cognisant of the strategic advantages of basing the force in the Firth of Forth, he expressed some doubts about its comparative advantage over Cromarty or even Scapa Flow. The approach to the Rosyth anchorage was long and narrow and would therefore be vulnerable to enemy minelaying and to ambush by enemy submarines. However, if adequate defences were provided and sufficient small craft provided for local defence purposes, those disadvantages could be overcome. Beatty assured Fisher that he was investigating those matters energetically.⁵ In the event, Inflexible relieved the Indefatigable in the Mediterranean on 24 January. Indefatigable proceeded to Malta for a refit; before sailing to England on 14 February to join the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron. By the end of February Beatty would have seven battlecruisers at his disposal, with the 1^st Battle Cruiser Squadron rather faster than the 2^nd. But for the moment he had only five.to Hipper’s four. The Queen Mary had departed to Portsmouth for a refit and he was unaware that the von der Tann was out of action.

On 15 January 1915, Beatty's force was formed into two squadrons. The first under Beatty’s direct control consisted of Lion, Tiger, and Princess Royal. The second squadron under Rear Admiral Sir Archibald Moore had only two ships, New Zealand as flagship and Indomitable. They had been based in the Humber together with a number of destroyers, the idea being that they would be in a good position to intercept raids on the East Coast, but they now joined Beatty in Rosyth. None of this was intended to affect Jellicoe’s overall control of the Grand Fleet, but the Admiralty as the centre of intelligence took on itself the task of directly instructing Beatty what would be the point of rendezvous . They also kept direct control of the Harwich flotillas and Keyes’s submarines. Direction would pass to Jellicoe once the forces came into touch.

In the first two weeks of January the plans Tyrwhitt and Keyes had for further operations were repeatedly postponed because of the weather. On 14 January after a further postponement, Keyes and Tyrwhitt had barely returned to their ships when they were recalled to London. The Admiralty had learnt through intercepts that the Germans were worried about a British descent on their ports. Not unreasonably the War Group concluded that the Bight would be patrolled by a large number of German destroyers and Tyrwhitt was ordered to make a sweep north east from Borkum as far as the Horns Reef to mop up the German patrols. Keyes was ordered to send three submarines to lie off Heligoland and the mouth of the Ems. Beatty was ordered to sea to support the operation. The Battle Cruiser Fleet would station itself west of the Bight and would remain until Tyrwhitt had completed his operation. Tyrwhitt sailed from Harwich at 1430 on 18 January straight into a snowstorm and similar weather bedevilled the entire operation. Unsurprisingly Beatty when he brought his battle cruisers down to support the operation, cruising to the west of the Bight, saw nothing other than a solitary seaplane. His force had been spotted, however, and not only by the seaplane. To the southwest two German submarines, the U8 and U35, had sighted Beatty’s ships and were endeavouring to raise the German signal stations to wireless the news. Von Ingenohl had an excited signal from the seaplane that at least one hundred British ships were inside the bight and raised steam. By the time he ordered out more planes and submarines, the ships had gone. At 1000 a disappointed Beatty had ordered the withdrawal of British forces. There was worse to come. Two of Tyrwhitt’s destroyers were damaged on the way back to Harwich and on the 21^st Keyes realised that one of his submarines, E10 was missing. Perhaps the most bitter blow, however, happened on the day of the operation: The Germans began their Zeppelin raids upon England.

“I am very sorry you drew a blank”, Jellicoe wrote, “but it seems that they are sitting very tight just now. Whether anything is in preparation one can’t say, but I always suspect their periods of quiescence. However the moonlight nights, except for submarines, are unfavourable times for their raiding affairs so it may be that there is really nothing doing. It is very trying as you say, but with the North Sea full of floating mines I don’t think we ought to move about the sothern part too freely. I shall be relieved when I hear of you having got north of the line Farne Id, - The Naze without ‘bumping’ on ... I have had several direct orders from the Admiralty not to send out ships. They have bad submarine nerves up there. After a long fight I got a compromise and they agreed to cruisers going out for the night only ...

As to the two BCSs being together, I never had any other idea, until each is strong enough to tackle the 4 Germans and that time won’t come till 2^nd BCS consists of Indomitable, Inflexible, Invincible, Queen Elizabeth, and New Zealand. Queen Elizabeth’s destination depends on her speed. If she can touch 27-28 knots I have said she should come to you. If she won’t do more than 26 knots, she should got to 2^nd BCS, and then I am not sure New Zealand should not return to you. I am trying hard to get Indefatigable and Australia. Thus we should be in clover and you could return to Cromarty. leaving Moore at Rosyth, or vice versa. I hate Rosyth. It is not my wish that you are there. Merely the Admiralty fear of a raid. I say it is entirely wrong to base our Grand Fleet ships on the basis of stopping raids, although of course if the raid is carried out by the enemy battle cruisers it does give us a chance of bagging them if we have a squadron handy. And at present it seems to be the only way of getting at the enemy…. I am very anxious for you to get a shoot with full calibre ammunition. The difficulty is to get Admiralty consent to your going west of Orkneys, while there are no suitable targets in the North Sea and there are submarines…. Look out for the Kaiser’s birthday, 27^th inst!!”⁶

Reporting the following day on the unsuccessful operation, Beatty added a note that “no details of the plans or movements of Commodore T and the Flotillas were communicated to me beforehand. I therefore was dependent for accurate information on what Commodore T might be able to send me by wireless, perhaps after suddenly meeting the enemy and becoming closely engaged. This might occur before daylight at short range or in misty weather and might cause the disablement of his wireless. I submit that to provide intelligent and effective support under such circumstances would not be possible.”⁷ Jellicoe agreed and made their views known to the Admiralty.

He had not only been expressing his concerns about the relative strength of the forces available to him and to von Ingenohl, but had shown himself extremely anxious that the battle cruisers stationed in the Forth should be withdrawn to Cromarty. Churchill would have preferred the entire battle fleet to come to the Forth and objected strongly. He even contemplated replacing Jellicoe, first making Beatty second-in-command to prepare the way for so drastic a step. On 20 January he sent a minute to Fisher: “The battle-cruisers ought to be kept together, as then we shall always have a force strong enough to beat the whole of the German fast vessels. They will be quite out of reach for any action to protect the coasts of England if they go to Cromarty, which is the same distance from Heligoland as Scapa. I therefore think they should not be divided or moved from the Forth, unless Admiral Beatty reports that he finds the navigational conditions dangerous. The outer line defences of the Forth are now nearly completed…. I see no reason why they should be mined in there more than at Cromarty, and in any case they ought not to proceed to sea without the channels being properly swept beforehand…” The matter was resolved to Churchill’s satisfaction the next morning and Oliver told to act on the decision.⁸

Tyrwhitt and Keyes waited to restage their operation should better weather come, but their planning was overtaken by Hipper’s determination to eliminate the British trawlers on the Dogger Bank, which he believed had been passing intelligence to the Admiralty, and also any light forces giving them cover. Although he secured backing for the move, von Ingenohl noted that he would “prefer it if such advances were made only when the fleet can proceed in company. Unfortunately this is impossible at the moment.” In fact the most powerful German battle squadron, the 3^rd, had proceeded through the Kiel Canal to exercise in the Baltic on 21 January. At 1025 on the morning of the 23^rd the 1^st and 2^nd Scouting Groups and two flotillas of destroyers were ordered to reconnoitre the Dogger Bank. “They are to leave harbour this evening after dark and to return tomorrow evening after dark.” The signal was intercepted and decoded by Room 40. The information was passed to Oliver.

Just after noon on Saturday 23 January Wilson marched into Churchill’s room at the Admiralty. Behind him came Oliver with maps and compasses.

“First Lord, those fellows are coming out again.”

“When?”

“Tonight. We have just got time to get Beatty there.”

In short order warning telegrams were sent to Tyrwhitt, Beatty and Jellicoe. That sent to Lion at 1223 read: “Get ready to sail at once with all battle-cruisers and light cruisers and sea-going destroyers. Further orders follow”. Jellicoe was told: at 1306 “First, Second and Fourth Battle Squadrons, cruisers and light cruisers should be ready to sail after dark this evening.” Churchill indicates that they thought a raid possible, but in fact the Admiralty knew that this was a more limited operation and they knew also what forces were involved. These did did not include the German battleships Hipper would take to sea the battle cruisers Seydlitz, Moltke, and Derfflinger, but he chose to add to them an armoured cruiser, Blucher, armed with twelve 8.2 inch guns, but designed with a maximum speed of only 24 knots. Four light cruisers, Rostock, Stralsund, Kolberg and Graudenz, and eighteen destroyers completed Hipper’s force.

To the north the capital ships began raising steam, while at the Admiralty they settled on a relatively simple plan. As Churchill recalled it, there was “just time for Beatty and Tyrwhitt to join forces at daylight near the Dogger Bank.” The task that faced Wilson and Oliver was to estimate the enemy’s course and speed and to plot a rendezvous that would allow the British Forces to “meet and be united at daybreak at some point about ten miles, or half an hour behind the enemy after he had passed westward and consequently between him and his home.” Oliver remembered it somewhat differently. They had guessed the enemy’s course with remarkable accuracy, but when they set the rendezvous Wilson set it about thirty miles south of what Oliver thought to be possible, given that Beatty would have to avoid a minefield off the Northumbrian coast. Rather than argue, Oliver chose to communicate his choice of rendezvous to the British forces. Whatever the truth of the matter, the rendezvous was set for thirty miles north of the Dogger Bank at a position 55.13’N, 3.12’E and Beatty was intended to be there at 0700 the following day, There he would be joined by Commodore (T) with the Harwich Flotillas. The whole force would then operate under Beatty’s orders with a view to locating and engaging with the enemy.

The 3^rd Battle Squadron under Bradford and Pakenham’s 3^rd Cruiser Squadron were ordered at 1415 to follow Beatty to sea and “to proceed to a rendezvous in 55° 35' N.,2° O' E., and be prepared to intercept enemy if they are headed off by our battle cruisers and attempt to escape north. V.A., 3rd Battle Squadron, should not interfere with ships under command of V.A., Battle Cruiser Squadron.” The Admiralty orders did not specify the time of arrival at the rendezvous; since it was 190 miles from Rosyth and the 3rd Battle Squadron could steam at over 15 knots, it could be anticipated that it would be in position by dawn. When Jellicoe queried subsequently whether Bradford would be there at 0700, he reported that he expected to arrive there at 0745 on the 24th.

Keyes, who had already put to sea on a different operation, was recalled and instructed to have four submarines off the Jade to attack any German units attempting to leave or return. He was subsequently ordered to despatch a further four submarines to ensure that every possible escape route was blocked, but since they could not be on station until the 25^th, they would play no part in the action as it actually developed. To the north Jellicoe would be at sea, essentially a contingency move just in case the Admiralty had missed the possibility of the High Sea Fleet also being out. He was subsequently to grumble that the signal made to him had come too late for his ships to play any part in the battle, but it was an illusory claim. Jellicoe told the Admiralty that by 0700 on the following morning he would be at a position 57° 28’ N., 1° 25' E., well to the north of where any action was likely to take place.

Filson Young and Spickernell were ashore in Edinburgh and had climbed to the castle ramparts. The latter, who normally remained aboard, refusing to leave his desk, noted that there seemed to be “an undue amount of smoke coming from the funnels of the battle cruisers. ‘There I knew what it would be,’ he said; ‘we have probably been ordered to sea, ciphers are pouring in, the Admiral has probably come on board, and here are you and I shivering …” They climbed down, had tea while waiting for the train, and found that the news was already around. “There was a frantic commotion at the slipway where the steam boats were waiting and much panic on the part of individual officers lest their respective boats should depart without them. In half an hour the pier was empty and the boats were being hoisted in ... We came on board at half-past five and found that all had happened as foreseen by the Secretary. There was an orgy of ciphering and deciphering going on in the Intelligence Office, and the orders which had been received really seemed to mean business. We were to sail almost at once for the rendezvous appointed by the Admiralty was some 220 miles away and we had to be there by daybreak …”⁹

Hipper’s squadrons sailed from the Jade at 1745 that afternoon. There was no suspicion in Hipper’s mind that the British knew of their movements. Beatty‘s ships began to sail at 1800. Tyrwhitt’s forces had begun to leave Harwich half an hour earlier in a dense fog. Beatty had received a copy of the Admiralty signal made to Jellicoe at 1445: “Four German battle cruisers, six light cruisers and 22 destroyers will sail this evening to scout on Dogger Bank, probably returning tomorrow evening. All available battle cruisers, light cruisers, and destroyers from Rosyth should proceed to a rendezvous in 55° 13' N., 3° 12' E., arriving at 7.0 a.m. to-morrow. Commodore (T ) is to proceed with all available destroyers and light cruisers from Harwich to join V.A., Lion, at 7.0 a.m. at above rendezvous. If enemy is sighted by Commodore (T) while crossing their line of advance, they should be attacked. W.T. is not to be used unless absolutely necessary. Telegram has been sent to C.-in-C., Home Fleet; V.A., Lion; V.A., 3rd Battle Squadron; and Commodore (T).” With about 220 miles to travel, Oliver had assumed that the Battle Cruiser Squadrons would cruise at 20 knots, but this was not made clear to Beatty. Further Admiralty telegrams at 1420 and 1630 urged Jellicoe to send any light cruisers he could spare south to Beatty since the Admiralty attached great importance to Beatty having as many light cruisers available to him as possible. Jellicoe himself was ordered at 1445: “Proceed with your main fleet towards the 3rd Battle Squadron’s rendezvous, 55° 35' N.,2° 0' E., and act as you think best to intercept the enemy, Avoid using wireless if possible until after daylight to-morrow, or until enemy is reported. Acknowledge. Telegram has been repeated to V.A., 3rd Battle Squadron, and V.A., Lion, for information.” At 1850 a final telegram went to Beatty: “After reaching rendezvous use your discretion to find and engage enemy, taking under your orders Commodore (T) and give instructions to him about 6.0 a.m., when he will have passed enemy’s probable line of advance,”

In the winter darkness Beatty’s five battle cruisers and Goodenough’s four light cruisers made their way slowly down the Forth. Bradford’s squadron followed at 2030. “We dined at 8.45 p.m. , when we were well past May Island,” Filson Young recalled. The mood was cheerful and relaxed, Beatty, dining with his staff, looking forward to the chance of action and quietly confident about the outcome. “usually we stood out to mthe eastward a good way after passing May Island, as the belt of mines laid by the enemy off the East Coast extended eastward for a considerable, although uncertain distance off St Abbs Head.” However, intent on making the rendezvous, Beatty on this occasion intended to take a more direct route even though it meant cutting through an area where enemy mines might be found. Goldrick has noted that , reasons unknown, his ships were steaming at 18 knots rather than the 20 Oliver had estimated. Perhaps they were looking to conserve fuel. This was before the days of paravanes, and it was left to Beatty to decide whether he should take his force through an area where a large number of drifting mines had been spotted or risk losing the opportunity to intercept the Germans. Beatty’s choice was predictable, perhaps inevitable. Young had the first watch in the Intelligence Office. “As his custom was, the Admiral looked in upon his way to his windy sea cabin, and we talked over the chart and the possibilities of tomorrow. For some curious reason we were confident on this occasion, in a way we had never been before, that we should meet the enemy on the morrow ... and there was an air of suppressed excitement which was very exhilarating.”¹⁰ Jellicoe and the admirably exchanged telegrams about the risk Beatty was running: “ Request I may be informed for future guidance whether it is considered desirable for ships to pass over area of drifting mines extending from coast to latitude 55° 40' N., 2° 20' E. Rosyth ships must apparently do this to-night to reach rendezvous at time ordered.” The Admiralty replied just after midnight: ”Direct course leads south of area indicated in signal of January 15th. Area does not extend to coast.” Nevertheless the route which the battle cruisers felt they had to take lay along the edge of an area suspected of containing mines. The Harwich force coming from the southward had only to pass round the North Hinder Light Vessel (51° 48' N., 2° 40' E.) and steer direct for the rendezvous. The battle cruisers might therefore anticipate sighting it to the southward on the morning of the 24th at about 0700 or nearly an hour before sunrise.

The night passed without incident. Apart from a gentle breeze from the north east, it was very still and the sea was calm. When Filson Young went to Lion’s Signal Bridge at 0630 he found Beatty already there together with his Flag Lieutenant. It was light enough to make out the battlecruisers following in Lion’s wake, but while “the eastern horizon showed light and the sea was beginning to grey…. it was still dark night about us….at 6.45 signals were beginning to come in from the Harwich Flotillas indicating that the rendezvous chosen by the Admiralty had been hit off exactly…”¹¹ Beatty had sent a wireless signal to Commodore (T ) at 0630 directing him, after meeting the battle cruisers, to spread his force on a line North and South to the Westward of them. Further signals would be passed visually. The signal was not logged in Arethusa and Beatty received no reply. Filson Young had gone down to breakfast at ten to seven and when he “returned fifteen minutes later the daylight was beginning to spread and the cloud-banks to roll away. It promised to be an ideal morning, with a light breeze from the N.N.E. and a slight swell on the sea.”¹² The navigating officer estimated that Lion had reached the rendezvous (53° 13' N., 3° 12' E.) at 0700. Course was altered to S. 12° W. and the bugles sounded action stations. Everyone was on the qui vive, full of anticipation. Shortly afterwards, at about 0710, the Arethusa with the leading destroyers of the Harwich force was sighted right ahead. They had just been identified, and ordered to take station three miles ahead, course S. 12° W., 20 knots,¹³ when flashes of gunfire were observed to the S.S.E.

Tyrwhitt’s force had become separated because of the thick fog in which they had left Harwich. The three divisions had proceeded independently, the Arethusa setting course for the rendezvous after rounding the North Hinder at 2140, the Undaunted at 2215, and the Aurora at 223≪. As a result, at 0700, when the Arethusa was approaching the rendezvous and almost within sight of our battle cruisers, Tyrwhitt had only 7 M Class destroyers with him. They were under the command of the Hon. Herbert Meade. The remainder of the Harwich force was some fourteen miles to the south, Aurora almost directly astern of the Arethusa; with Undaunted visible at dawn on her port bow.

Goodenough’s light cruisers had been steering a parallel course to the battle cruisers, five miles on the port beam. When he sighted Arethusa Beatty recognised that this meant that there was no enemy immediately to the south and he signalled his light cruisers to spread out on a line of bearing north-east by north from Lion.¹⁴ Even before his signal it would seem that they were already spreading out. “The day was so clear,” Goodenough recalled, “that only the shape of the earth prevented one from seeing everything upon it.” As Tyrwhitt was taking station three miles ahead of the battlecruisers, Beatty saw gun flashes to the south-south-east. Almost at the same moment, a signal from Aurora announced, “Am in action with the High Sea Fleet.”¹⁵ She repeated the signal twice more, but Arethusa had already passed it to Lion by searchlight. There was momentary amusement on Lion’s bridge at this somewhat grandiose claim, but prompt action also. Telling Chatfield to steer in the direction of the gun flashes, Beatty cancelled his earlier signal to the light cruisers and ordered them to “chase S 10 E” to get in touch with and report the movements of the enemy.¹⁶ “This order was acted upon with great promptitude,” Beatty reported; “indeed my wishes had already been forestalled by their respective Senior Officers, and reports almost immediately followed from Southampton, Arethusa and Aurora as to the position and composition of the enemy.”¹⁷

Aurora had actually tangled with the German light cruiser Kolberg on the port wing of Hipper’s cruiser screen. When he sighted a three-funnelled cruiser and four destroyers at 0705, Wilmot Nicholson at first thought he had sighted the Arethusa and closed to 8,000 yards before making the challenge of the day. Kolberg replied by opening fire with startling accuracy. Aurora was hit three times, although the damage was slight. Nicholson opened fire and made his signal that he was in action with the High Sea Fleet. Kolberg was hit, observers said underneath the forebridge, and her fire became ragged as she turned away. Nicholson decided not to pursue her, but in company with Undaunted, who had not been close enough to join the action, he headed to join up with Beatty. Further hostile forces appeared on Aurora’s starboard quarter and both British light cruisers turned north-east to stay in contact. On this course they were in sight of Southampton by 0730 and through her Nicholson reported the presence of the enemy both to the SE and ESE. He indicated specifically that the ships to the SE were battlecruisers and those to the ESE light cruisers, but he was mistaken. Southampton sighting them a few minutes later reported then as steering to the NW. Then, as King-Hall notes, “we saw them turn 16 points and make off home at full speed. The sea was of an oily calm, and it was soon evident that the battle was to lie amongst the engineers as much as between anyone else.”¹⁸

Hipper, alerted by Kolberg’s signal had turned towards her, thinking perhaps that her opponents were some of the light forces he had come to mop up. But it was already in his mind that the fishing boats he had passed in the night might have reported his presence and he “was anxious at all costs to avoid having enemy forces between me and the German Bight at daybreak.”¹⁹ As he approached Kolberg, she warned that she had sighted smoke to the SW and at virtually the same moment the light cruiser Stralsund in the van reported seeing heavy smoke to the NW. A signal from Blucher followed: she had sighted seven light cruisers and more than twenty destroyers to the NW on a course parallel to their own but out of gun range. Hipper realised immediately that they formed part of a much larger force which would include dreadnoughts; and Stralsund appeared to confirm that surmise when she reported further that she had observed “at least eight large ships under the smoke cloud to the north west.” Wireless call signs intercepted at that moment appeared to indicate that these were Warrender’s 2^nd Battle Squadron. If that was the case, it seemed evident that Beatty’s battlecruisers would be close at hand. Hipper turned for home, ordering his force at 0735 to steer SE at 20 knots. It is evident that, rather than making off at full speed, he was waiting to see how the situation would develop. Twenty knots would be sufficient to keep him clear of any British battleships, but it was three pr more knots below the speed he could have ordered had he already been trying to make good his escape. However he took the precaution of recalling his light cruisers and destroyers. If there was to be a stern chase, strung out behind his battle cruisers, they would be vulnerable to gunfire from the British battlecruisers and, if damaged, would have to be left behind.

Beatty had not yet sighted Hipper but his alteration of course to SSE and increase in speed to 22 knots had been well calculated. In the course of the next quarter of an hour he hauled around slightly further eastward and worked up to something like full speed. At a signal from the flagship Tyrwhitt also sent his destroyers ahead to report the strength of the enemy and he followed in their support. At 0735 Southampton made two signals: the first, made visually reported that “Aurora S.S.W. reports enemy cruisers E.S.E. Enemy battle cruisers S.E.”, the second made to Jellicoe as well as Beatty gave “My position 96 P. 45.1 Enemy in sight. Battle cruisers E.S.E.”²⁰ A further signal to Lion at 0745 gave the information “Enemy sighted are four battle cruisers, speed 24 knots.”²¹ Southampton was then some 17,000 yards north west of Blucher and Goodenough had determined that his squadron would remain on the port quarter of the enemy maintaining relatively close contact. In practice this varied from as much as ten miles to as little as 13,000 yards. Hipper had ordered his own light cruisers and destroyers to take up station ahead of his battlecruisers leaving Beatty’s light forces little to engage, but opening himself to a possible attack from British destroyers. Beatty had already ordered that Jellicoe be given then news “Enemy in sight 44 K.34.²² Course E. Battle cruisers and cruisers, number unknown.”.²³ At about 0745 according to Chatfield, about five minutes later by Beatty’s own report, Hipper’s battle cruisers were visible from Lion. In another four minutes or so they were visible also on the port bow of New Zealand. The chase was well and truly on.

Although too far from the action to expect that the Grand Fleet might have any part in it, Jellicoe could nevertheless take steps to further close the net. By 0800 he had reached a position some 150 miles north-west of the point where Beatty had started his chase. He had already despatched the 2^nd Light Cruiser Squadron to join with Bradford. The latter with the 3^rd Battle Squadron and 3^rd Cruiser Squadron had reached his rendezvous to the north of the Dogger Bank at about the same time. Jellicoe signalled him to proceed at his utmost speed to the eastward lest the enemy break away to the north-west, while he swung the Grand Fleet to starboard to intercept them should they attempt to come north.

Southampton signalled Lion at 0759, “Enemy in sight are battle cruisers and light cruisers steering between SE and S.” Beatty had them in sight on the port bow. Gathered with him on the compass platform Beatty were his Flag Captain, Chatfield, the Flag Commander, Plunkett, the Navigating Commander, Edwards, the Secretary, Spickernell, the Flag Lieutenant, Seymour, another Lieutenant , and, quite inevitably, Filson Young. They were exhilarated by the prospect of a successful chase, but conscious that it would be long drawn out. Lion was still some twelve and a half miles, 25,000 yards, short of Blucher. Beatty took the chance to go below for a hasty breakfast and when he resumed his place on the bridge, Chatfield too breakfasted. At 0816 Beatty ordered “Speed 25 knots.” He spoke with Percy Green , Lion’s engineer Commander: “Get us within range of the enemy. Tell your stokers all depends on them.” “They know that, sir”, was Green’s reply.

Not only did they know it, but they were working flat out and performing miracles, not least in the oldest of Beatty’s ships, Indomitable. Brian Schofield, who served as a Midshipman in her, later wrote down his memories of that day: “The furnaces devoured coal as fast as a man could feed them. Black, begrimed and sweating men working in the ship’s side dug the coal out [of the bunkers] and loaded it in to skids which were then dragged along the steel deck and emptied on the floor plates in front of each boiler. Looking down from the catwalk above, the scene had all the appearance of one from Dante’s Inferno ... Watching the pressure gauges for any fall in the steam pressure, the Chief Stoker walked to and fro, encouraging his men. Now and then the telegraph from the engine room would clang and the finger on the dial move round to the section marked ‘More Steam’” The Chief would press the reply gong with an oath, ‘What do the bastards think we’re doing? Come on boys, shake it up, get going’, and the sweating men would redouble their efforts, throw open the furnace doors, and shovel yet more coal into the blazing inferno.”²⁴

Hipper had turned sharply to port at 0807, partly with the idea of engaging with the British light forces, but in the main to help his own light forces gain their station ahead of the 1^st Scouting Group. Goodenough responded by turning his squadron east and at 0812 Southampton signalled, “Enemy altering course to NE.” However, he was not too alarmed. He recognised the purpose of Hipper’s manoeuvre and anticipated correctly that he would soon be resuming his flight. Aurora and Undaunted were still steaming abreast of one another 7,000 yards apart with their flotillas strung out astern. In Arethusa Tyrwhitt moved to a position very nearly ahead of Lion, but recognising the high speed of the M class destroyers, he gave Meade the freedom to close on Blucher. She responded by opening fire and the destroyers felt compelled to turn away. After only a few rounds had been fired, however, the Germans resumed their flight and Meade again began to close.

Brief though Hipper’s alteration had been, it had helped Beatty get to the southward of Hipper’s course. Beatty wanted to obtain a leeward position to prevent the smoke from his own ships obscuring the sight his range takers would have of the enemy “and if possible to get to the southward between the enemy and their base.”²⁵ The wind was blowing from the north-east. By 0815 he had very nearly attained the position for which he was looking, and he swung his ships on to a course parallel to Hipper’s, increased speed to 25 knots, and ordered his battlecruisers take station form on a line of bearing seven points abaft the beam on her port quarter. Not only did this clear their arcs of fire but it ad the additional benefit of allowing them to read flag signals more easily. At 0823 Beatty ordered a further increase in speed to 26 knots. settled down for what would inevitably be a lengthy stern chase. To those on Lion’s bridge it seemed clear that as the battlecruisers worked up their speed, they were gaining on the enemy. Handicapped by the presence of Blucher, Hipper was steadily losing ground and Beatty looked to press home his advantage. At 0823 Lion made to Battle Cruisers “Speed 26 knots.” Southampton had taken up an excellent position on the enemy’s port quarter at 0824 she wirelessed, clearly for Jellicoe’s benefit, although the signal was addressed to Lion, “My position 54.53N 4.5E. Enemy in sight consists of 4 battle cruisers and 4 light cruisers, steering between E. and S.E.” Signals from the Arethusa at 0828 and Meteor at 0829 confirmed that Hipper had altered course from E to SE and at 0830 Beatty ordered his ships to steer S.40 E.

Only the M class destroyers had the speed to close the range and Meteor managed to come within 8,000 yards of Blucher before coming under fire and falling back on Arethusa. Beatty, however, knew that the Battle Cruisers were drawing within range and he recalled the Commodore and his destroyers to take station on his starboard bow where they would not foul the range. No one on Lion’s compass platform had any thought as yet of retiring to the conning tower. They were all in high spirits, exhilarated by the speed at which they were travelling and with a strong sensation that every time the signal for another knot of speed was hauled down, Lion appeared to leap ahead. And yet, as Filson Young recalls, “there was never any sense of the ship being urged forward, but rather of her being held back, as though by a bit, which she was striving to get between her teeth.”²⁶

At 0835 Beatty signalled Jellicoe: “Enemy sighted consists of 4 battle cruisers, 4 light cruisers and destroyers, bearing S. 61 E< eleven miles. My position 54.44 N. 3.44 E., course S.40 E., Speed 24 knots.” Jellicoe responded by ordering Bradford to steer for Heligoland, while he held on as he was. Speed was now the dominating factor and at 0843 Lion made to Battle Cruisers “Speed 28 knots. New Zealand and Indomitable had a design speed on 25 knots, while even Beatty’s fastest three ships were not designed to do more than 28. Nevertheless at 0853 he signalled for 29 knots. For a while it seemed that the impossible was in sight of achievement. The 2^nd Battle Cruiser Squadron was keeping up better than anyone expected Indomitable managed 26 knots. Beatty signalled at 0855, “Well steamed, Indomitable.” The message was speedily passed to the stokehold. Inevitably and quite inexorably as Beatty well knew they would Lion and her immediate consorts began to draw away from New Zealand and she in turn from Indomitable. Massie suggests that Beatty was willing to take the risk of potting three ships against four, but it is more likely that he thought that if he could envelop Hipper’s rearmost ships. Hipper would be forced to fight and that then his remaining ships would speedily close.

If Filson Young is right, Blucher opened fire at 0844: Beatty and his officers watched until about 25 seconds later when there was a spout of water well off on Lion’s port bow. It seems unlikely that she was firing at Lion. The range was too great. Nevertheless Chatfield asked control for the range and was told about 22,000 yards. Above 15,000 yards, as he observes, the British rangefinders were known to be very inaccurate. Longhurst, the gunnery officer, asked whether they should open with armour piercing or common shell and Chatfield told him to use armour-piercing. It was a matter of minutes before the range was down to 20,000 yards and Chatfield proposed that they should open fire slowly and steadily. Beatty agreed and Chatfield told Longhurst to try a sighting shot. It was 0852. Some fifty seconds later they could see that the shot had fallen short. The gun elevation in Lion’s two forward turrets was adjusted slightly and two further shots fired. This time they were over. Chatfield promptly swung his ship two points to starboard to bring his full battery to bear and Lion began a slow and steady fire on Blucher. It is worth noting that this was the first time that Beatty’s battle cruisers had ever fired at such a range. The previous maximum had been 16,000 yards in the experimental firing in the spring of 1914. “The enemy at this time were in single line ahead, “ Beatty reports, “with light cruisers ahead and a large number of destroyers on their starboard beam.”²⁷

At 0900 Tiger joined in the firing and at 0905 Beatty felt able to signal “Open fire and engage the enemy.” He had stationed his ships in echelon rather than line ahead so that they could bring their guns to bear. Lion and Tiger were firing full salvoes, but Princess Royal when she opened fire at 0907 began with sighting shots. Neither New Zealand nor Indomitable were yet in range. At 0905 Hipper signalled “Am in action with 1^st battle cruiser squadron 109 7 [i.e. 145 miles WNW of Heligoland], Course south-east-1/4 south.” The signal does not appear to have caused von Ingenohl to hurry his preparations, but when deciphered at the Admiralty It would seem to have been 0911 before Hipper was in a position to return fire at a range estimated at 20,000 yards,²⁸ but by 0920 all of his ships were firing on their pursuers. Their fire control was greatly hampered because the British ships were astern and the dense smoke from their won funnels partially obscured them. A splendid story told by Drax can relate only to this moment. As they saw the first German salvo heading for Lion, Beatty yelled out: “Duck”. The officers with him on the compass platform to a man did so, and when they straightened up, they saw their Admiral bursting with laughter. They realised immediately that the sides of the compass platform offered them no protection at all and that Beatty was enjoying the trick he had played. He was “in high spirits and totally relaxed.”²⁹

The Germans were startled by the British ability to fire at long range, so much so that they seem mistakenly to have thought that he was not trying to close. Lion seems to have been making good practice, although Filson Young’s claim that it was easy to distinguish “between the bright, sharp stab of white flame that marked the firing of the enemy’s guns and this dull, glowing and fading glare which signified the bursting of one of our own shells”³⁰ has to be taken with more than a grain of salt. Nevertheless Blucher was hit well down on the waterline by Lion’s third salvo, probably fired at about 0909, and she was thought to have begun to slow from that moment. She was further damaged by Lion’s fourth salvo. Part of her after superstructure was carried away, her after two turrets disabled and many of her men injured. Although New Zealand was unable to open fire until 0935 and Indomitable remained out of range for another ten minutes, with both Tiger and Princess Royal firing regular salvoes, Lion was in a position at 0820 to switch her fire to Derfflinger³¹ at a range which Beatty gives as 18,000 yards.³². The leading German ships could now be seen from her fire control positions. There reports from prisoners after the event that Lion’s new target had been hit aft and that a considerable amount of damage had been done, but it is difficult to know what weight to place on these reports.

At about 0920 there were signs of a change in formation amongst the enemy destroyers. In anticipation that they might be mounting an attack Beatty ordered his own destroyers to take station ahead and proceed at their utmost speed. Tyrwhitt’s M class destroyers were ahead and to starboard, and while some of his older craft would find it difficult to gain on the battle cruisers, Beatty could count on them and the Arethusa to screen his battle cruisers from attack If Filson Young is correct, it was just after this that with the enemy shot falling on both sides of Lion and drenching her decks that the Admiral’s staff divided, some going to the conning tower, while Young and the Flag Lieutenant proceeded to the foretop. Chatfield tells us that he went to the conning tower, and by some accounts Beatty accompanied him. If he did so, it was for a few minutes only. As Chatfield notes “it was situated immediately behind B turret, noisy and wet from spray and from steaming at high speed through the vast columns of water which somehow incredibly forced their way through the lens thread of my Ross binoculars. Edwards, the navigating commander, put on an oilskin.”³³ Recognising the limitations of the view to be obtained from the conning tower and with spray further impeding what he could see, he resumed his position on the compass platform. Exposed and subject to the full force of a bitter wind as it was, it was by far the best place from which to control the activities of his squadron. It is worth noting, however, that the signalmen appear at this time to have abandoned the signals bridge for the signal tower.

The Germans were concentrating their fire on Lion . She was firing on Derfflinger, but Tiger and Princess Royal continued to concentrate on Blucher. Young notes an unmistakable hit on the enemy at 0925, but not the first hit made on Beatty’s flagship three minutes later. Corbett notes that that the “shell took her on the water-line and penetrated her bunkers. The damage was soon made god with hammocks and mess stools, but it was clearly time to break the enemy’s fire concentration.”³⁴. At 0935, when all the German ships were within effective range, Chatfield secured Beatty’s permission to fire at the leading ship, assumed at the time to be Derfflinger, but in fact Hipper’s flagship, Seydlitz. Beatty ordered a signal to be made, “Fire on your opposite numbers”. His intention was that each of his ships should take their opposite number, Lion engaging Seydlitz, Tiger the Moltke, Princess Royal the Derfflinger, and New Zealand the Blucher. As sent, the signal read “Engage the corresponding ships in the enemy’s line.” While the signal appeared to take no account of the fact that there were five British battlecruisers to the enemy’s four and did not identify any ship by name, Beatty was probably aware that Indomitable had dropped a long way astern and was not yet in range. Pelly in Tiger not only assumed that the whole squadron was in action, but chose to disregard the clear meaning of the signal. He had in mind the provision in the GFBOs and that decided that he should continue firing at Seydlitz, leaving the rear three ships to concentrate on their opposite numbers. Moltke was thus left unimpeded to make effective practice with her 11 inch guns against Lion. Since Derfflinger and Seydlitz were also concentrating their fire on her, Beatty’s flagship soon began to suffer. Her signalmen abandoned Lion’s bridge at 0930 for their action position, and thereafter orders had to be passed by voicetube. This does not appear to have caused any problems. However, twenty minutes later at 1050 the starboard halliards of the action position and the main wireless aerial were shot away. The aerial fell across the feeders, earthing bot the main and battle aerials. For the next forty minutes Lion’s auxiliary W/T was used to pass signals to New Zealand for retransmission, but at 1034 because of fumes, the auxiliary W/T office had to be abandoned and shortly afterwards the electricity supply failed, putting out of action Lion’s searchlights and arc lights. This was a major factor later in the action.³⁵

Initially Seydlitz could not reach Lion with her 12-inch guns since the range was about 17,500 yards, but Lion found her new target almost at one. A hit at 0943 inflicted serious damage. Scheer notes that Hipper’s flagship was hit so hard that she could not use her heavy guns aft for the remainder of the action. “The first shell that hit her had a terrible effect. It pierced right through the upper deck in the ship’s stern and through the barbette-armour of the rear turret, where it exploded. All parts of the stern, the officers’ quarters, mess etc., that were near where the explosion took place were totally wrecked. In the reloading chamber, where the shell penetrated, part of the charge in readiness for loading was set on fire. The flames rose high up into the turret and down into the munition chamber, and thence through a connecting door usually kept shut, by which the men from the munition chamber tried to escape into the fore turret. The flames thus made their way through to the other munition chamber, and thence again up to the second turret, and from this cause the entire gun crews of both turrets perished almost instantly. The flames rose as high as a house above the turrets.”³⁶

Tiger times her receipt of Beatty’s signal at 0941. She was already firing on Seydlitz, although as Southampton notes, she had not got her range and all her salvoes were going over. Corbett has Princess Royal and New Zealand unfired at and making excellent practice on their opposite numbers. Both Seydlitz and Derfflinger had been hit twice in the first hour, Blucher only once, while the Germans, hampered by their own funnel smoke had manage to hit Lion twice. Between 0952, when Beatty reduced speed to enable his ships to close up, and 1030, Seydlitz suffered only one hit, sustaining little further damage. Moltke, left unfired at, was able to make excellent practice. Lion’s fire control would seem to have been hampered by the splashes from enemy shots falling short. There was considerable uncertainty about the fall of shot and fire had more than once to be checked. At about 1020 she “came down” 4,500 yards.

The two leading German ships were concentrating their fire on Lion and she was beginning to suffer. At 0954 a heavy shell hit the roof of A turret, stove it in and disabled one of the guns. An 11-inch shell from Seydlitz penetrated Lion’s waterline armour aft at 1001. It passed through the top of the 4-inch magazine’s trunk without exploding. The engineer’s workshop was flooded and from there the water spread to the open switchboard compartment, short circuiting two of the dynamos, and disabling the after fire control and secondary armament circuits. Lion took a list to port, but he speed was unimpaired, Indeed Beatty increased speed at 1010. It was not until she was struck simultaneously at 1018 by two 12 inch shells from Derfflinger that her progress was checked. Filson Young in the foretop recalled that she “received a blow so violent that we thought we had been torpedoes. The ship seemed to stop, and the mast, to which the foretop was secured, rocked and waved like a tree in a storm and the ship seemed to be shaking herself to bits.” But then, just as they were contemplating the possibility that they might find themselves precipitated into the sea, “the old Lion seemed to pick herself up and go on again.” One shell had hit the armour below the waterline and had driven several plates in. The foremost port bunkers flooded. The other pierced the armour on the waterline forward and burst in the torpedo body room. In a few minutes all the adjacent compartments were flooded up to the main deck. The German fire was too hot and accurate for comfort and Beatty, who had closed the range to about 17,500 yards by successive turns towards the enemy, felt forced to resort to zigzagging.

Behind the thick screens of smoke generated from the German destroyers, it was not always possible to discern what the enemy were about and it was no longer possible to observe the fall of shot. Both Tiger and Princess Royal had to check fire from time to time because of the impossibility of getting a range. Shortly after 1000 Blucher appears to have sheered away towards Goodenough’s light cruisers. At least that was what he believed to be happening and Beatty observed the move, mistakenly attributing it to Hipper’s entire force: in fact it was only Blucher’s move that he could see. Hipper seems to have been equally misled into thinking that the light cruisers were about to attack. He ordered his battle cruisers to engage with their port armament and drive them off. At 1005 Blucher’s attack on the light cruisers caused Goodenough to turn away briefly and open out the range. While this was going on, the German battle cruisers maintained their course and speed apart from the occasional zigzag to throw out British fire. It looked to Beatty as if Hipper’s rearmost ships had hauled off to station themselves on the port quarter of Seydlitz and he responded by ordering his own ships at 1022 to take up station on a line of bearing NNW from Lion or about six points abaft the beam, and to proceed at their utmost speed.

In his despatch Beatty notes that the enemy destroyers “then showed evident signs of an attempt to attack and I signalled to the squadron to that effect. Lion and Tiger opened Fire with 4-inch and 6-inch guns respectively and caused them to retire and resume their original course. The 6-inch guns of Tiger performed very useful service at a long range and certainly succeeded in placing two salvos among them at 12,000 yards.

14. Any attempt on our part to close the enemy by altering course to port was met by the enemy’s torpedo craft steering more to starboard, so putting us in a position of having to cross their track; this had to be avoided, owing to the danger of their minelaying. We had therefore to depend on maintaining our speed and establishing an overlap ahead before we could close sufficiently to force them to the northward or bring them to close action.”³⁷

Nevertheless Beatty turned his ships together a point to port at 1035 and again at 1045, before ordering his ships at 1047 “Close the enemy as rapidly as possible consistent with keeping all guns bearing.” Had this signal been read, nuch of the confusion that followed might have been avoided, but only Tigerr took it in and then only the first part, “Close the enemy.”³⁸ By now Blucher had dropped considerably astern of the remaining German Battle Cruisers and at 1048 “hauled out to port steering north”. She had a heavy list, was on fire, and clearly in a defeated condition. Beatty therefore ordered Indomitable “Attack enemy making to the northward.” Beatty intended her to finish off Blucher while the remainder of his squadron hunted down the German battlecruisers.³⁹ It was evidently Beatty’s intention that his ships should make ground to port to comply with his signal, and at 1052 Lion altered course to ENE.

With her speed down to 15 knots and falling she was hardly in a fit state to continue. With all three German battlecruisers now concentrating their fire on her, she had been heavily hit again at 1035: “two shells hit the Engine Room Artificers’ bathroom,” Chatfield notes, “penetrating the armour and also the upper bunkers in the vicinity, which were flooded. Another shell burst in ‘A’ turret lobby, doing local damage and causing a small fire, which was rapidly extinguished. At 10.41 a.m. ‘A’ turret magazine was reported on fire, and I gave the order to flood the magazine. After 2 feet of water had been admitted, the report was discovered to be erroneous, Between 10.49 and 10.51 a.m. several hits occurred with 11-inch or 12-inch shell. The only serious one drove in the armour plates below the waterline abreast ‘F’ boiler room, shaking the ship considerably. The port feed tank was injured and some damage caused in the port engine room. The rush of salt water through the overflow pipe necessitated the stopping of the port engine and the ship heeled considerably to port.” Chatfield’s factual account of the damage may be complemented by Plunkett who noted that “the whole ship seemed to lift and shake violently as the projectiles struck us. From these reports, of armour belt pierced on the waterline in several places, switchboard room flooded, port engine reducin g speed and shortly to stop, ‘A’ turret magazine on fire, ship making water heavily along ports side, all lights gone out, it was clear that we could not long continue in action, while it was more than possible that within a few minutes we should be projected heavenwards by the magazine exploding.” The engine room reported to Chatfield that the port engine must reduce speed and might have to be stopped. Chatfield conveyed this “horrid news” to Beatty and the latter records that by 1051 Lion’s “port engine was stopped, all lights were out, she was making water rapidly, listing heavily to port, and was unable to maintain her place in the line.” Beatty’s first thought was that she had hit a mine.

It was at this critical juncture that Beatty gave what was to become a most controversial order, “Eight Blue”. Chalmers notes that “Beatty’s decisions at this critical moment had to be made under heavy fire in a split second from a sloping bridge of a listing ship”⁴⁰ and the group on the compass platform had also been buffeted and chilled by the wind. The point is well-made. It is all too easy to criticise from an armchair, with all the benefit of hindsight. Beatty explained the reasons for his order in his despatch, but his explanation has only added fuel to the flames. “At 1054 a.m. submarines were reported on the starboard bow and I [Beatty] personally observed the wash of a periscope 2 points on our starboard bow. I immediately signalled ‘Turn 8 points to port together’. This signal was hauled down at 11 a.m. As this turn would take us across the track of enemy destroyers, it was important that it should be sufficiently large to take us clear of it before we reached the position they were in at this moment, so as to avoid the mines which they would probably take the opportunity of dropping.” Indomitable subsequently reported that a torpedo had been fired at her, but there were in fact no German submarines in the area, information known to the Admiralty, but not conveyed to either Jellicoe or Beatty, presumably lest it reveal too much about the source of the intelligence.

Signals made and received between 1027 and 1113

Lion	Tiger	Princess Royal	New Zealand	Indomitable
1027. Form on a line of compass bearing NNW and proceed at your utmost speed (flags)	1022. Form on a line of compass bearing NNW 1024. Proceed at your utmost speed	1023. Form on a line of compass bearing NNW 1028. Proceed at your utmost speed	1035. Course NNW. 1036. Proceed at your utmost speed	1035. Course NNW
Not logged			1040. Speed 36 knots
1035. Turn together 1 point to port (flags)	1035. Correct	1035. Correct	1042. Correct	Not logged
1045. Turn together 1 point to port (flags)	1045. correct	1047. correct	1052. correct	Not logged
1047. Close the enemy as rapidly as possible consistent with keeping all guns bearing. (flags)	1051.Close the enemy	Not logged	Not logged	Not logged
1105. Turn together 8 points to port (flags).	1102. Correct.	1105. Correct.	1110. Correct	Not logged
1110 Course NE (flags)	---	Not logged	---	---
1112. Attack the rear of the enemy (flags)	1115. Attack the rear of the enemy bearing NNE	1120. Attack the rear of the enemy	1121. Attack the rear of the enemy bearing NNE.	1108. Attack the rear of the enemy bearing NNE
1113. Keep nearer the enemy. Repeat signal Admiral now is making (flags)	Not logged	1121. Repeat signal Admiral is now making.	Not logged	110. Repeat signal Admiral is now making. Attack the rear of the enemy.

Beatty has come under savage attack for this decision, most particularly from Bacon who devotes an appendix in The Jutland Scandal to what he thinks a bad mistake by an inexperienced Admiral. Both in this analysis and a later attack, he ignores the clear statement that a number submarines were reported, not just the one that Beatty “saw”.⁴¹. The inference, never clearly stated, is that Beatty was panicked by what he saw. That seems unlikely. Not only would it have been out of character, but Beatty had chosen to ignore the risk of torpedo fire from the after tubes on Hipper’s battlecruisers. Bacon’s entire argument is based on the assumption that Beatty’s decision was based solely on his personal observation of the wash of a periscope. He judges, probably correctly, that Beatty could not have seen what he did had it been more than a mile off, but with seeming fairness allows a mile and a half. His argument is twofold. Where it lay the “submarine” was at most a threat to New Zealand and that Lion should in any case have turned towards it. Had Beatty thought he was dealing with a single submarine in the position at which he “saw” it, the right course of action would indeed have been that favoured by Bacon. But, as Marder points out, the anticipation was that his force, not Lion herself, was running into a submarine trap. Bacon’s animus is so clearly on display in this appendix that his charge would not warrant much attention had it not been picked up by Jellicoe himself in after years. Ironically the danger that Beatty mistakenly identified was precisely that which Jellicoe himself feared (see page) and it has to be said that the Germans were in a position to lay such a trap. They had submarines available on the 23rd, but chose not to send them to sea until it was too late.

Beatty’s caution at that early stage of the war is understandable. His mistake lay in the speed with which he reacted and the fact that he gave no reason for the turn. Plunkett turned to Beatty in astonishment and said, “Good heavens, Sir, you’re not going to break off the engagement.”⁴² Beatty had no intention of doing so. Had he thought for a moment, he would have hoisted the submarine warning signal to give an indication of the reasons for his order. Pelly, Captain of Tiger, was among those confused by it. “Whilst this signal was still flying, I observed the flagship developing a big list. She was evidently badly damaged. She began to drop back and from then on took no further part in the action. Tiger steered to pass between her and the enemy, and the German’s fire was concentrated on her [Tiger]. For nearly five minutes this ‘Alter course’ signal remained flying and giving us all plenty of time to comment on it. I remember asking my navigating officer if he could explain the meaning of it for to my mind it seemed to be breaking off the action. He replied, ‘I have no idea, unless Lion has better knowledge of minefields about than we have.’”⁴³

Almost immediately Beatty realised that he had turned the battle cruisers too far and he ordered “Course N.E.” In his despatch he explained that this would not only bar Hipper from returning to Blucher’s aid, but that, if Hipper chose to abandon her, he could turn his ships back on to a apparel course and continue the pursuit. The signal was made at 1102, but again for some unexplained reason it was not hauled down, but remained flying until 1105. In New Zealand Moore and his staff had retired to the conning tower and were clearly having considerable difficulties with their view of what was going on. The spray was not only affecting all periscope glasses, but was driving in through the openings in the conning tower, “wetting all glasses”, he reported, “which it was absolutely necessary to use, owing to the great distance.” Visual signals are “difficult to read”, he added, blaming smoke and bursting shell. Although he denied it subsequently, this would seem to be his explanation for reading the signals flying from Lion as “Attack the enemy’s rear bearing NE”. Lion had only two pairs of signal halyards left and neither wireless nor searchlight was available to complement the message conveyed by flags. Much appears to turn on whether the Compass pendant was hoisted superior as ought to have been the case, or inferior as was reported to Moore.⁴⁴ In fairness to New Zealand’s signal staff and to Moore, it should be said that Tiger appears to have read the signal in the same way. Princess Royal seems to have missed the signal altogether.

The case against Beatty and Lion’s signal staff has been put most temperately by Massie (although oddly he has the latter still on the signal bridge and not further aft where their hoists were bedevilled by funnel smoke and their position drenched in spray): “As Lion dropped astern, the admiral did his best to impose his will on the deteriorating situation and make clear his intentions. Ironically this attempt did further damage. At 11.02 a.m., Beatty had ordered ‘Course North East’ in order to countermand his previous 90-degree turn and substitute a 45-degree turn, which would bring the battlecruisers back more quickly on Hipper’s trail. For Beatty, however, a simple course correction was no enough; his nature required exhortation. Thus, while the ‘Course North East’ flags were still flying from one halliard. He ordered Seymour to hoist ‘Attack the rear of the enemy’ on the other remaining halyard, which happened to be adjacent. Herein lay the source of the confusion which followed. The Lion was now simultaneously flying two separate signals that Beatty did not intend to be connected. The other battle cruisers did not understand this.” His order to “Attack rear of the enemy” had resulted in the flags A.F. being hoisted at 1105 alongside Compass B.⁴⁵ Seymour or his staff had made two mistakes. Not only had ‘Course North East’ not been executed by being hauled down, but Beatty’s subsequent signal appeared to be flying below it. It is small wonder that the remaining battle cruisers were confused. It is probable that Beatty on the compass platform was wholly unaware of what had happened. However Seymour should have been aware that the “Course North East” signal had not been hauled down. The Compass pendant was hauled down only as Beatty’s final signal was bent to the halyards.

In hindsight, it seems obvious that Beatty should have relinquished all attempts to control his squadron, but there was no signal available to allow him to do so. Nor would it have been easy for a man of his temperament to become a hapless onlooker. “What we need now is Nelson’s signal, ‘Engage the enemy more closely’,” Plunkett suggested. “Yes, certainly,” Beatty replied. “Hoist it.” Seymour referred to the signal book, found that it was not included, and asked whether he should hoist the closest modern equivalent, signal 74 “Keep nearer the enemy.” This was done at 1107 and, as Filson Young records “This signal, with ‘AF’ and another hoisted on a tack line, ‘Repeat the signal the Admiral is now making’, was flying as the Squadron passed, and remained flying until it had gone out of sight ...”⁴⁶ He is echoing Beatty report that he “kept the signals ‘Attack the rear’ and ‘Keep closer’ flying till the remainder of the squadron has passed out of sight.”⁴⁷ Young’s recollection may be misleading in one respect. The best available charts of the action suggest that Tiger had passed Lion more than twelve minutes earlier and had come under the same concentrated fire that had damaged Lion.

Beatty’s despatch, while clear about his own actions in regard to Lion and his subsequent effort to rejoin the squadron, makes surprisingly little reference to their actions in the interim. Moore’s despatch times Beatty’s signal “turning the whole squadron 8 points to port” at 1110 bringing them on to a course “approximately N by E and almost at right angles to the enemy’s course, the three leading ships of the enemy quickly increasing their range in consequence. At 11.20 a.m. the Vice Admiral made a general signal: ‘Attack the rear of the enemy bearing NE’; this was apparently the Blucher (she bore approximately NE from New Zealand at the time). Princess Royal and Tiger apparently acting on this, altered course to circle round Blucher, passing ahead of New Zealand in doing so, Indomitable passing astern and turning up to port.” A number of observations seem in order. Although Moore had seen Lion listing “heavily to port and gradually dropping out of line”, it does not seem to have occurred to him that this might impair Beatty’s ability to command the situation. Since Beatty continued to make signals, that is understandable if unfortunate. But the remainder of his account offers some puzzles. First, if Blucher bore approximately NE by N from New Zealand, and the remaining German ships E by N, Moore would have to assume not only that the bearing NE was Blucher’s bearing from Lion; but that Tiger would also take that to be the case when obeying the signal. In practice he seems to have taken his lead from Tiger and much of his reasoning looks like justification after the event. On his own reading of the signals he should have followed his 8 point turn with a turn towards Blucher, but instead we find Princess Royal and Tiger apparently passing ahead of New Zealand .It is difficult to see how they could do so if their actions and New Zealand’s were as Moore represents them. Corbett’s charts do not help since by 1105 both Tiger and Princess Royal are shown as steering a parallel course to New Zealand and marginally further to the north. Tiger on the basis of this chart did not alter course again until 1109 but then steered a north-easterly course that would have taken across Blucher’s stern. Four minutes later she turned roughly ENE and at 1121, having by this time crossed Blucher’s track, she turned east.

The general belief is that Tiger and her consorts interpreted Lion’s signal to mean that they should add the weight of their fire to that already falling on Blucher. Philbin, for example, has Rear Admiral Moore taking over the fight and Beatty reaching Princess Royal by destroyer at 1230. “By that time, the distance between Hipper and Beatty had widened such that reengagement was impossible; Beatty could not catch the fleeing Germans. The cause of this was Rear Admiral Archibald Moore, who had mistakenly read the signals and the situation to mean he should concentrate his force on the already damaged Blucher and let the rest of the German force get away; ‘certain signals were made by Lion which were either wrongly received in New Zealand or other ships, or not received at all ... This resulted in your intentions being misinterpreted.’”⁴⁸ Goldrick had earlier written, “Beatty was hoist with his own petard. The image of near-infallibility which had been created, of the man who was always right, misled Moore in no mean fashion. The Vice Admiral, Moore reasoned, must have some good purpose in his mind. What was the enemy’s rear? Blucher. What did Blucher bear? North-east. What did the signal read? ‘Attack the rear of the enemy bearing North East’”⁴⁹ Massie has Moore issuing “no fresh orders to modifying or countermanding Beatty’s last signal. At 1109, therefore, Tiger, Princess Royal, and New Zealand ceased firing at the fleeing German battle cruisers and swung around to join Indomitable in the final destruction of the already doomed armoured cruiser Blucher.”⁵⁰ This echoes Corbett, who wrote: “The Tiger and Princess Royal at once ceased firing on the Derfflinger and Moltke, and edged off to starboard to circle round the Blucher.”⁵¹ Although he acknowledges that there was no formal transfer of command, Marder also has Moore squarely in his sights: “Unaware that Beatty believed he had sighted submarines, Moore supposed that the squadron’s 8-point turn to port was meant to ensure the destruction of Blucher. He was doubly certain when he saw the Blucher bearing north-east from the British squadron, the direction apparently indicated in Beatty’s signal, And so all thoughts of destroying the main force passed out of his mind.”⁵²

That may well be the case, but there are a number of puzzling features about the accepted story. First and most obvious Moore did not take control of the situation. Although he passed Beatty’s signal to Indomitable by flag and by searchlight, he appears not to have thought of taking command until Lion was out of sight – by his account at 1130 - and he made no signal of his own until 1152 (i.e. 1146), when he decided to break off the action. It would seem that he was content to follow Tiger’s lead. To that extent Philbin is wrong and Moore’s interpretation of the signal relevant in so far as he thought Tiger was carrying out Beatty’s intentions. Pelly’s ship had been hard hit after passing the wounded Lion. She was hit three times in rapid succession. The first shell struck the roof of Q turret and, although it did not penetrate, it appears to have disabled the left hand gun in the turret and to have killed two men. A second shell exploded in the forward superstructure. It not only destroyed the intelligence office and signal distribution station, but the blast disrupted the conning tower and gun control tower. Pelly was badly shaken by the severe explosion, which “blew up through the gun control tower, rendering everybody in it hors de combat and killing Engineer Captain Taylor and six men ...” As he recalled it “rattled us all in the conning tower very considerably” and severed most of his communications. He also thought the director and main gunnery control were out of action. In fact the ship’s fighting abilities were unaffected. The third shell set fire to the boat stowage between the funnels and the fuel store for the motor boats caught fire causing a vast sheet of flame that caused those aboard Moltke to think her opponent had blown up. In fact the fire was brought under control within a quarter of an hour. Pelly had found himself steering a different course to the other battle cruisers and in the midst of the confusion and damage, eventually he “decided more or less to complete the turn which appeared to be in accordance with the other ship’s movement.” This can only have been the 8-point turn. Beatty’s trenchant verdict was that he had run amuck. “He rode the P.R. right out and she had to put her helm right over to clear him. I think the shell that landed under [the] control tower upset them and knocked those in the conning tower out temporarily although he won’t say so, but for a time Tiger was all over the shop.” There was evidently a great deal more confusion than the charts show.

Timing these events remains difficult, but on the assumption that Tiger’s turn to a north easterly course at 1109 represents Pelly’s understanding of Beatty’s signal, it seems plausible that it signals also the end of a period of some confusion aboard Tiger and in which her movements are quite uncertain. Like New Zealand, she appears to have repeated Beatty’s signal by flag, but then between 1109 and 1137., followed throughout by Princess Royal and New Zealand, Pelly made five alterations of course: the initial turn NE at 1109 was followed at1113 by a turn to ENE, followed by a further turn to starboard at 1121 which took the squadron on to an easterly course with further turns at 1130 and 1137 leaving them on a south easterly course, still in pursuit of Hipper but a very long way astern. Only in the loosest sense could this be described as circling the Blucher. In fact Tiger, after crossing Blucher’s wake, some way astern of her, had continued on a course which for at least thirteen minutes took her further away from her. The course that Pelly then chose continued to diverge from both that taken by Blucher and from the course steered by Hipper. Even the turn at 1130 only brought them after a minute or two on to a course broadly parallel to that followed by Blucher.

By then she was in a bad way. Her speed was dropping, her fore turret and both ports side 8.2-inch turrets were out of action, and it was clear that she would not be able to make her escape. Pelly engaged her with his starboard 6-inch batteries and fired a torpedo at her, but he was emphatic in his retrospective denial that he had abandoned the chase after the “turning signal had been made and the Lion out if action”, believing that “the Tiger alone had given the lead in which she was not supported.”⁵³ While there is clearly some truth to his claim, the lead he gave was more than a little uncertain. Rather more oddly, given Moore’s own despatch, the author of his obituary in The Times was also certain that he had “continued the pursuit.”⁵⁴ As we have seen, he had done little more than follow Tiger’s lead. Pelly’s decision to cross astern of Blucher before turning on to a parallel course is hardest to explain. Had he wanted to combine firing at close range on her while still making ground to the east, he could have turned to a parallel course and passed down her starboard side. Pelly’s movements seem to have combined a degree of caution over Blucher’s ability to hit back (“two could play at that torpedo game”) with a desire to return to the chase. While pounding her in passing, his evident intention, once he had done so, was to set a course which would allow the chase to continue. His best hope, although it does not seem to have been one that he entertained, was an attempt by Hipper to do something to rescue Blucher from her fate.

Hipper had certainly not given up all thought of doing so. He had thought that an attack by his destroyers, although they might suffer heavy losses in the process, could cause considerable disruption. At 1058 he had turned his battle cruisers south-west and two minutes later ordered his destroyers to attack. While it is difficult to reconcile the times given in the British and German accounts, it would seem that Hipper took the 90 degree turn by the leading British battlecruisers as a response and judged that it put the German destroyers in the worst possible position from which to deliver a successful attack. He recalled them at 1107. Tempted to attack himself, he was bluntly told by his own officers that it was impossible. Von Egidy, in command of Seydlitz, pointed out that two of his five turrets were out of action, there was 600 tons of water in her stern and he had only 200 shells left for his main battery. Derfflinger too had been hard hit. There was no prospect of help from the High Sea Fleet. Head must rule heart, and Blucher be left to her fate. Hipper ordered his squadron to resume their south-easterly course and made an untroubled escape.

Meanwhile what of Beatty? Although in despair over what was happening, he took immediate action, first to secure the safety of his flagship, and then to rejoin the remainder of his command. Told at 1103 that the injury to Lion was not capable of immediate repair, Beatty ordered a message be passed to Tyrwhitt to close. Since the two remaining signal halliards were in use, the message was passed by semaphore. Tyrwhitt was asked to detail a submarine screen for the stricken ship and course was set NW. He left Undaunted, Aurora, and, with the exception of Lookout’s division, all their destroyers to screen Lion and then took Arethusa east to rejoin the M class destroyers. Content that Lion was secure and on her way home, Beatty summoned the destroyer Attack alongside at 1120 and at 1125 transferred his flag to her. As he came down to make his crossing, Beatty found the crew “around him cheering, and in the enthusiasm of the moment, one of them clapped him on the back and shouted ‘Well done, David.’” Because of Lion’s heavy list to port, Beatty was able to cross to Attack’s forecastle, followed by his Flag Lieutenant. By Beatty’s account the transfer was complete by 1235. As Attack pulled away, the “men came up from below to see the Admiral leave, and the sight of him seemed to send them off their heads. It really was a remarkable scene as the Lion was one huge grandstand of cheering men,” Seymour told his mother, “but she looked rather a sad sight heeled over to port with a great many holes in her side.”⁵⁵ Beatty headed off at full speed to rejoin his squadron.

Blucher was near her end. Her fire had briefly forced Goodenough to turn away at 1105, but he had resumed his south easterly course and was again engaging her at a range considerably greater than that of the battlecruisers. Meade was concentrating four M class destroyers to make an attack. At 1120 he led them in and they managed to secure what they estimated to be five hits by torpedoes on the stricken ship. She still packed some punch. A shell struck Meteor forward, partially disabling her, and she also managed to fire a torpedo at the Arethusa, which missed. Arethusa closed to 2,500 yards, which Tennant thought “rather risky considering the Blucher was still firing.” In fact she still had two turrets in action. However Arethusa launched two torpedoes, one which struck Blucher under the fore turret and the other by the engine room. She lost all power and lights and at about 1145 Tyrwhitt recognised that she had struck and signalled Moore to that effect. Arethusa closed to pick up survivors. “She was in a pitiable condition,” Tyrwhitt told his wife; “all her upper works wrecked, and fires could be seen raging through enormous shot holes in her sides.” Her crew were still defiant, but as Tyrwhitt’s flagship closed to within a hundred yards, Blucher rolled over to port and turned turtle. For a few minutes more she floated bottom upwards and then sank. As the British began the work of rescue, a German seaplane appeared and began to rain hand bombs upon them. The Zeppelin L5, which had been observing the course of events, noted that Blucher heeled over and capsized at 1207. Although German accounts claim that she did not seek to bomb the British ships, the British were certain that she had done so. Goodenough ordered them to withdraw, but Tyrwhitt stayed as long as possible. Only 234 Germans out of some 1,200 men survived.

Shortly afterwards Moore, who had lost visual touch with Lion at about 1124,⁵⁶ and had received no wireless signal from Beatty for half an hour, concluded that he must take command of the three remaining British battle cruisers. They were steaming on their original course towards Heligoland in no particular formation. He had last seen Lion listing badly and professes to have had grave fears for her safety. But his principal reason for abandoning the chase was his estimate of the time it would take to overhaul Hipper, whose ships were now some 12 ½ miles distant and “steaming at least 25 knots”. There was no prospect of regaining effective gun range for a couple of hours and by then Hipper would be close to Heligoland. Moore may have over-estimated the speed of the retreating ships,⁵⁷ but it seems likely that he had also have underestimated how far they were ahead. Some think that it could have been as much as 30,000 yards. More to the point, while he might have brought them within range of his guns, if he ventured that close to the German bases, he could well be confronted with the High Sea Fleet. His ship had actually intercepted a signal from the Admiralty to Keyes, although they thought it was from Keyes to the Admiralty, which read “High Sea fleet coming out”. His decision to turn back was far from unreasonable. Jellicoe was at at that moment wondering whether he should order the battle cruisers to abandon the chase. At 1152 Moore signalled them to form single line ahead, New Zealand leading, followed by Princess Royal, Tiger and Indomitable, and set course West.⁵⁸ He was aware that Blucher had surrendered and could not last long. Leaving a light cruiser and several destroyers to ensure that Blucher sank and to rescue her surviving crew, Moore was on his way back to Lion, when Beatty arrived on the scene.

After leaving his flagship, Beatty had ordered Attack’s commander to take him at full speed to Princess Royal. He came up with the returning battle cruisers at about noon. Moore had just signalled his position to Jellicoe, adding “course NNW, speed 20 knots. Commodore (S) reports High Sea Fleet coming out. Am retiring.”⁵⁹ At 1202 he followed this with an order to his ships to “Cease firing.” Blucher was in flames and on the point of capsizing. At a loss to understand why the battle cruisers were steaming towards him, Beatty ordered them to make a 16 point turn. He intended to continue the pursuit.⁶⁰ He ordered Attack alongside the Princess Royal and clambered aboard. Princess Royal records that his flag was transferred to her at 1227.⁶¹. In passing we should note that Beatty was highly complimentary about Lieutenant Commander Callaghan’s skill in twice laying his destroyer alongside the larger ship to facilitate a swift transfer which would leave little opportunity for a German submarine to attack.⁶² Once on board, he was briefed by Brock on all that had happened in the previous hour and a half and it rapidly became clear that it was not only too late to continue the chase, but that if the High Sea Fleet was coming out, it would be a risky as well as a pointless exercise. As Seymour observed, "It was like trying to win the Derby after a bad fall at Tattenham Corner." They were some eighty miles from Heligoland, little more than three hours steaming. It would be at least ninety minutes before he was into range and by then the High Sea Fleet would be close at hand. Reluctantly perhaps, but wisely, he turned from the chase at 1245. Altering course to west south west to return to Lion, he signalled Jellicoe as he did so: “One enemy’s battle cruiser sunk, two are seriously damaged. Lion badly damaged, reduced to 12 knots. Shifted flag to Princess Royal and covering her retirement. High Sea Fleet out, enemy submarines sighted.”⁶³

His chief concern was now his crippled Lion. Although well-screened, she was making her way home at a speed that was no more than 10 knots. Bradford with the 3^rd Battle Squadron and the 3^rd Cruiser Squadron was coming to his support at a speed of 16 knots. By the time they came in sight the 2^nd Light Cruiser Squadron should have joined them. Bradford had disposed his cruisers some fifteen miles ahead of his battleships and the two forces linked up at 1345. Bradford had been told not to interfere with Beatty’s command and did not pull rank. Instead he conformed to Beatty’s movement by altering course NNW. He was some twenty five miles off. The 2^nd Light Cruiser Squadron was placed under Beatty’s command and deployed to the east with the First to screen Beatty’s retiring force, distant ten miles. But part of Beatty’s mind was still set on ways to turn the situation to advantage. At 1430 he suggested to Jellicoe that he retain only one flotilla of destroyers in the screen and despatch the rest to attack the advancing High Sea fleet. There was no reply, but in any case Beatty soon thought better of the move. Lion had developed trouble in her remaining boilers and it was evident that her starboard engine might have to be closed down. Lion’s speed dropped to six knots. Briefed by his engineer commander, Chatfield passed the news to Beatty and at 1530 the latter ordered the Indomitable to take her in tow. He knew Captain Kennedy to be an exceptional seaman and Kennedy did not let him down. Even so it was more than an hour before a 5 inch wire hawser was in place, and towing could begin. Beatty had returned to Lion to assess the damage and watch the two being put in place. Getting a deadweight of some 33,000 tons under way posed an enormous challenge and it is far from surprising that the strain was too great: the wire parted. A 6 ½ inch hawser was passed and with great care, Kennedy was finally able to get Lion under way. She had restarted her starboard engine at 1700 to help.

Jellicoe had been about an hour behind Bradford. Meeting with him at 1530 he ordered his ships to join in the Grand Fleet’s sweep to the south. An hour later Beatty was in sight and Jellicoe turned northward and reduced speed. He kept station on the battlecruisers until dark, By Indomitable’s reckoning it was 1724 before Lion was on the move, and by then Jellicoe had taken further steps to strengthen her screen. He had been warned by the Admiralty at 1545, “Germans are preparing a night attack by destroyers but the two flotillas which were out with their battle cruisers last night have no enough fuel to take part. Our destroyers should protect damaged ships.” With the exception of vessels short of fuel, the 2^nd and 4^th Flotillas were detached and added to the vessels already protecting Lion. “The wounded Lion in tow of her consort was surrounded by a cloud of destroyers,” Filson Young recalled, “and from her bridge that evening I watched in the calm twilight the beautiful evolutions of their craft, weaving in and out in ever changing formation. All about us as far as we could see, the divisions were zigzagging weaving their web of safety around us.” At nightfall Tyrwhitt, in command of something like sixty destroyers,⁶⁴ issued a blunt warning at nightfall: “Keep a good look-out for submarines at dawn. If seen, shoot and ram them regardless of your neighbours.” Left without much protection themselves, at dusk the heavy ships, battleships and battlecruisers, stood northward to be clear of torpedo attack and the 1^st and 2^nd Light Cruiser Squadrons joined the battlecruisers in the dark hours.

It was a tense night. Indomitable with Lion in tow had been achieving about 10 knots, but at 1900 Lion’s starboard engine failed and the pair could barely manage seven. It seemed certain that the enemy would know of the damage to Lion and would make some attempt on her, but the night passed without incident, In fact the reports from L5 had misled the Germans into thinking they had sunk Tiger. They did not even realise, it would seem, that Lion was damaged. But it was a long haul back. Initially the hope was that she might be taken to the Tyne, and tugs were ordered to sea to bring her in. However, it was soon realised that the injured ship’s draught was such as to prevent her from using that river and instead she was taken at slow speed to Rosyth. During the first night, a change of course was made to avoid the direct route north of the Tyne minefield, and when daylight came she was still over one hundred miles of her base and well within the area where German submarine activity might be expected. The flotillas reformed as a submarine screen, but no enemy showed. As some of Lion’s flooded compartments were pumped out and the ship trimmed, Indomitable could increase her speed and by midnight on the second night, the tow was off May Island. Beatty returned aboard, accompanied by Tyrwhitt, and together they stood on the bridge as Lion was slowly towed up the estuary by tugs. She still drew too much water to pass beyond the Forth bridge and anchored below it while tugs brought further pumps to aid the work. The journey could then be completed. There was a problem; “we had no capstan and no steam.” Lion’s energetic Commander, ‘Carlo’ Fountaine was not daunted. He devised a sevenfold 1 ½ inch wire purchase and with the aid of a small electric winch was able to weigh anchor. “There was a thick fog that morning” Filson Young recalled, “but as we approached the little island on which the central pier of the Forth Bridge is founded, we could hear the sounds of cheering coming faintly to us through the mist, which thinned just enough to show us the shore of the island thronged with people cheering and waving. Lion’s band played ‘Rule Britannia’. As we came under the bridge, we could see that the mighty span was lined with diminutive human figures, waving and cheering.”⁶⁵ As Victor Hayward recalled, “the Lion came limping in under the Forth Bridge, being still towed by the Indomitable, with the famous signal flying from her yard arm: ‘Well Done The Black Squadron Of The Indomitable’…. We cheered her in and followed her into the dockyard, still cheering by means of anything that would float – drifters, picket boast, cutters, etc – our tremendous cheers could be heard as far away as North and South Queensferry. The whole Fleet went wild with enthusiasm for our fighting flagship.”⁶⁶

While Lion was on her way home, the King had sent a signal: “I most heartily congratulate you, the officers and ships’ companies of squadrons on your splendid success of yesterday. George R.I.” Jellicoe was equally effusive. “I have waited to congratulate you on your fine achievement until I could do so by telegram. Please accept for yourself and all under your command my warmest thanks for all you have done and my most sincere appreciation of the result of your efforts. The successful return of Lion is a fine feat, reflecting the greatest credit on all concerned. Please telegraph me a short account of the action and probable damage to enemy. I am deeply grieved to hear of the death of Engineer-Captain Taylor and the men named in your telegram, but the victory has been gained with the minimum loss of life.” Tiger and Princess Royal had returned the previous morning and, as Victor Hayward recalls, “leaning over the bridge, our soldier friends enquired after Lion and we told them she would arrive eventually. They gave us a great cheer and waved newspapers at us, saying, ‘It’s all here,’ The Admiralty had rightly claimed a victory and, of course, the British press made it sound like a great triumph.”

In fact the Admiralty had issued a communiqué, which The Times headlined

BATTLE IN THE NORTH SEA
GERMAN RAIDERS FOILED
THE BLUCHER SUNK
BRITISH LOSSES SLIGHT

A brief account of the action was followed, which concluded: “Their Lordships have expressed their satisfaction to Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty.”⁶⁷ The paper’s naval correspondent, who was not, of course, present, waxed lyrical over the marksmanship of the battle cruisers at high speed and had no doubt it was a “brilliant affair”. He allowed himself to speculate that the damaged German battle cruisers might have been sunk and thought it a “very appropriate birthday present” for Lord Fisher. More to the point were his remarks that it was “welcome news and inspiriting. It will be some consolation to our seamen for the disappointment they experienced on the last occasion that Germany sent out battle cruisers for a raid. The pitcher may go once too often to the well…. After this affair the German newspapers and their naval critics will cease their gibes about the British fleet being condemned to inactivity and afraid to leave its ports. One large armoured cruiser sunk and two battle cruisers seriously damaged are fairly good evidence that our seamen are on the alert and quite ready to give the enemy an opportunity for showing what they are made of whenever he cares to seize it.”⁶⁸

The Daily Mail published a remarkable photograph of the Blucher, hull uppermost, with her crew scrambling over her like ants from a destroyed ant hill, a picture so widely used that it left no one in any doubt the Beatty had once again won a famous victory. Fisher wrote “a few lines of sincere gratitude for your good fight” on 25 January. “It will be interesting to hear how your firing affected the German ships. The Seydlitz and Derfflinger (but don’t mention this fact to a soul, as we get it through an Agency) has to hustle into dock, and yet not one single casualty in Derfflinger. I suppose the Lion hit a German mine. I do hope you will be able to repair her rapidly, as these incidents will be repeated, as Lutzow is coming along for early commission. Sad that Queen Mary was away,” He added, “Jellicoe will never be in it – he is too far off at Scapa – he might as well be at Timbuctoo! He ought to be at Rosyth, as you ought to be at the Humber, now the submarine defence is finished and 8 berths ready.”⁶⁹

Jellicoe wrote on the 26^th: “I know very little as yet about Sunday’s action, but take the opportunity of Backhouse’s going south⁷⁰ to send you a line of warmest congratulations on your success. I was just writing out a signal to tell you not to go any further when I got Moore’s wire to say you had turned. They had apparently arranged a pretty submarine trap for us. It was a great relief to hear that Lion was safely in to-day and I hope she can be patched up soon…” He added: “I am not at all well. Crocked up yesterday. Very bad attack of piles and general run down…”⁷¹

Beatty replied immediately: “A thousand thanks for your very kind letter of congratulations. I, my officers, and ships’ companies, appreciate more than anything the commendation of OUR Commander in Chief. We had a great day, great luck in being in the right place or nearly so, but this time the weather was too clear, they were the wrong side, and could see 14 or 15 miles so it was literally a stern chase. Backhouse will give you all the particulars far better than I can now. Condition of Lion is that we have emptied all her flooded compartments except coal bunkers and can fix them up. We are getting coal out of the bunkers, patching from outside and then from the inside. In two places we received very heavy bangs displacing armoured plates about 1 ft. below the water line – not losing them. I think they were caused in each case by 2 12-inch projectiles from Derfflinger who continually landed 2 projectiles practically in the same spot at the same time. I thought at the time we had struck a mine or been hit by a torpedo but the divers report that they found the marks of projectiles. Their 11-in. is no good, seldom burst and the effect when they do very local. The 12-in. is serious, but not to be compared to our 13.5. Their guns are good, calibration too close, gun laying excellent, but the projectile no good, and I am sure we can stand a lot of it…. You must take the greatest care of yourself. What we should do without you the Lord knows. Sunday’s action impresses on one the necessity of speed – slow battle cruisers are no good – and also the necessity of CONCENTRATION!!! If we had been spread it was quite possible the slower ships had never got up at all.”⁷²

Hayward has another memory: "Two days later [28 January], Sir David Beatty had all his boys clustered around No 3 dock at Rosyth, and standing on top of a bollard he addressed us ... I remember most of his famous speech, and several sentences still ring out clear in my mind. Through a megaphone he told us, 'You have won the first round, so now keep on keeping on,' And with a merry smile he quoted a parody of a poem from a Gilbert and Sullivan opera:

There is a beauty in the howling of the blast,
There is fury in the raging of the gale,
There is a terrible outpouring
When the Lion starts a-roaring,
And the Tiger starts a-lashing of her tail."⁷³

An angrier letter followed from Fisher had been penned on the 27th: "I've already written to tell you that you're splendid. But I cannot understand when you were left behind in Lion why Tiger and Princess Royal, absolutely unharmed, did not go on and finish off Derfflinger and Seydlitz, VERY HEAVILY ON FIRE (BOTH OF THEM). (I hear this from eyewitnesses), and both seriously damaged, and this 'cessation' of fighting takes place at NOON, when still 3 hours off the enemy's minefields (or possibly 4 hours). You are mistaken about the enemy's submarines – we know from themselves exactly where they were – hours off you ... It is simply ABSOLUTELY INCOMPREHENSIBLE to me why Moore discontinued the action at NOON! When the Seydlitz and Derfflinger both heavily on fire and very badly damaged and they had to scuttle into dock with great urgency and a very great number killed. It's quite terrible to me that they should have been allowed to go free at noon. WHAT POSSIBLE EXPLANATION IS THERE? What excuse have we to offer?"⁷⁴

Filson Young recalls that Beatty "had a letter from Lord Fisher urgently enquiring how it was that the action had been broken off; and as the matter was extremely confidential it was decided that I should carry the reply to London the next day. But that night, while we were all at a somewhat hectic dinner given by the Lion's gunroom to the Admiral and his staff, orders came that the battle cruisers were to go to sea. There was only time for the Admiral to write to Lord Fisher, telling him that I knew his mind and could give him the information he desired, and to give me verbally a brief outline of his views on the action, supplemented by a dozen lines scribbled in my notebook in his own hand, containing a succinct explanation of the occurrences between 11 a.m. and noon."

Young reached London on the evening of the 29th and saw Fisher immediately. He was not immediately recognized, but when Fisher had read Beatty's note, he realised it was Young and shook his hand. "Well, tell me about it", he said. "how was it that they got away? What's the explanation? Why didn't you get the lot? And the Derfflinger – I counted on her being sunk, and we hear that she got back practically undamaged. I don't understand it." Young based his explanation on the Admiral's notes – "purely technical, having to do with the alteration of course and signals made as the Lion was dropping out of the fight. 'Submarines?' he said. 'There weren't any; we know the position of every German submarine in the North Sea, and there wasn't a mine within fifty miles.' ... 'Come,' he said, 'you were there. You saw it. What do you think? What is your own opinion?' I told him what I thought, which was very simple and could be said in one sentence, Lord Fisher made no reply except a brief 'Oh!' and sat for perhaps a minute staring hard at me, during which time I began to wonder whether I had mot been perhaps a little too frank." Once out of the room, Fisher's naval assistant told him that he had put his foot in it; Moore was one of Fisher's men, but when Young began to apologise, he was told not to worry: "'He's not so keen on him now.' All of which was extremely characteristic, and not very pleasant," Young recalled.⁷⁵

For all the gloss put on the outcome, in private he was bitterly disappointed. When he wrote to Keyes on 10 February, he allowed his true feelings to show: “My dear Roger!”, he wrote, “The disappointment of that day is more than I can bear to think of, everybody thinks it was a great success when in reality it was a terrible failure. I had made up my mind that we were going to get four, the lot, and four we ought to have got. There is no blinking it, we had them beat, another half-hour would have done it, when the old Lion was done. My feelings when ‘the merry hunt went heedless sweeping by', and then swept in the wrong direction, was more than words can describe.

However they are still there for another day. It was a thousand pities you had not our submarines waiting for them.”⁷⁶

By then, but privately, the post mortem on the action was under way and there would be a reckoning.